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TRADEMARK MORALITY
MARK BARTHOLOMEW*
ABSTRACT
This Article challenges the modern rationale for trademark rights.
According to both judges and legal scholars, what matters in adjudi-
cating trademark cases are the economic consequences, particularly
for consumers, of a defendant’s use of a mark, not the use’s morality.
Nevertheless, under this utilitarian facade, judicial assessments of
highly charged questions of right and wrong are also at work. Recent
findings in the field of moral psychology demonstrate the influence
of particular moral triggers in all areas of human decision making,
often without conscious awareness. These triggers influence judges
deciding trademark disputes. A desire to punish bad actors,
particularly those deemed to insufficiently invest of themselves in the
marketplace, results in an overbroad consideration of the defendant’s
intent. Judicial conceptions of sexual propriety guide trademark
dilution law. Loyalty to certain views and markers of nationhood
explain judge-made rules that privilege particular meanings for
national symbols over consumer welfare. These three examples show
that moral intuition can produce very bad trademark doctrine. The
Article concludes that moral concerns will inevitably influence
* Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School. I would like to thank Alena Allen, Shyam
Balganesh, Ann Bartow, Barton Beebe, Irene Calboli, Michael Carroll, Stacey Dogan, Dave
Fagundes, Christine Haight Farley, Brett Frischmann, William Gallagher, Leah Chan
Grinvald, Rob Heverly, Justin Hughes, Sonia Katyal, Greg Lastowka, Peter Lee, David
Levine, Glynn Lunney, Irina Manta, Jessica Mantel, Bill McGeveran, Mark McKenna, Lisa
Ramsey, Jeremy Sheff, Jessica Silbey, John Tehranian, Rebecca Tushnet, Mary Wong, and
Peter Yu for their insightful comments and feedback. This Article benefited substantially
from presentations at the 2012 Law & Society Annual Meeting, the New York University
School of Law, the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, the
Washington College of Law at American University, the 2013 International Trademark
Association Annual Meeting, the Erie County Bar Association Federal Practice Committee,
and SUNY Buffalo Law School. Frances Stephenson and Jay Organek provided helpful
research assistance.
85
86 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:085
judges, but they will do less harm if, instead of being hidden behind
economic rhetoric, they are brought to the surface and interrogated
just like any other technique of legal argument.
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“The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere
force of language continually invites us to pass from one domain to
the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have
the boundary constantly before our minds.”1
INTRODUCTION
Looking at modern trademark jurisprudence, it appears that, at
least in one area of the law, Holmes’s cautionary statement has
been taken to heart. The legal community today typically frames
trademark law through the lens of efficiency. Judging from pub-
lished decisions and law review articles, trademark law’s prime
directive is to remove obstacles from the consumer experience.2 As
noted by one trademark scholar, “Current thinking about trademark
law is dominated by economic analysis, which views the law as a
system of rules designed to promote informational efficiencies.”3
According to this line of thinking, by preserving the signaling power
of particular words and symbols, trademark protection reduces
consumer search costs and prevents wasteful confusion. This
protection must yield only when consumers derive an even greater
informational benefit from a defendant’s use of another’s
trademark.4 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (1897).
2. See, e.g., Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distribution, LLC, 562 F.3d 1067,
1072 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2009); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th
Cir. 1985); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006); Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of
Trademarks, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 823, 834 (2007). 
3. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621
(2004); see also Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New
Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 453, 461 (2001) (“[T]he conceptual model underlying American
intellectual property law is utilitarian: rights are granted for social objectives (advancing
knowledge and producing useful products).”); Brett Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna,
Intergenerational Progress, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 123, 129-30 (“[I]t is fair to say that the
utilitarian view of IP dominates and that alternative theories have had relatively little effect
on policy in recent years.”); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of
Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 75 (2012) (“[I]t would be nearly impossible to overstate
the extent to which the search costs theory now dominates as the theoretical justification of
trademark law.”).
4. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 189 (2003). For example, non-mark holders may use a mark not
as a source identifier but to describe their product or to engage in comparative advertising.
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The focus on efficiency suggests a cold, dispassionate, and
rational approach to questions of trademark protection, one that
disclaims ethical considerations. What matters are the conse-
quences, particularly for consumers, of a particular use of a mark,
not the use’s morality. As one court recently explained: “[T]rademark
law [is] not [a] matter[ ] of strong moral principle. Intellectual
property regimes are economic legislation based on policy decisions
that assign rights based on assessments of what legal rules will
produce the greatest economic good for society as a whole.”5 Given
this predominant thinking, judges are criticized when they stray
from the focus on economic consequences and appear to apply their
own moral intuitions to a trademark dispute.6 
Nevertheless, under the surface, a very different rationale than
the economic justification described above guides many trademark
decisions. Consider the following:
• Embedded within trademark doctrine are evaluations of the “good
faith” of the defendant, particularly in the multiple factor tests
for determining likelihood of confusion and likelihood of dilution.7
• Empirical study suggests that evidence regarding intent, rather
than being an afterthought or only a small portion of the analysis,
is of “decisive importance” and a finding a bad intent “creates ...
a nearly un-rebuttable presumption” in favor of the plaintiff.8 
• Courts take particular care to police unauthorized use of marks
in sexual contexts, even going so far as to create a full-fledged
See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1968).
5. Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
vacated, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
6. See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(“Neither [plaintiff] nor this court has legal right, moral authority, social responsibility, or
judgmental power, to intrude into commercial trademark rights based on moral disapproval
of the trademark owner.”); Bone, supra note 2, at 553 (describing critics who blame recent
expansions in trademark protection on judges “applying their own moral intuitions”).
7. E.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (listing “the
intent of the defendant in adopting the mark” as one of ten factors to be analyzed in
determining likelihood of confusion); EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors,
Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 66-68 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing role of defendant’s good faith
in fair use defense).
8. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1622, 1628 (2006); see infra Part II.B.
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presumption of trademark dilution when a defendant uses a mark
to sell sex-related products.9 
• Even if United States consumers are aware of a foreign mark and
unaware of a domestic business using the same mark, courts will
award priority rights in the mark to the domestic business.10
• A finding that a trademark contains “immoral ... or scandalous
matter,” may bring “national symbols ... into contempt, or
disrepute,” or consists of “the flag or coat of arms or other in-
signia of the United States” renders the mark ineligible for
federal registration.11 
In short, despite the dispassionate, economically-focused lan-
guage typical of modern trademark jurisprudence, judicial assess-
ments of highly charged questions of right and wrong are also at
work.12
Uncovering the specific moral intuitions behind trademark juris-
prudence is not easy. Judges make efforts to keep the emotional
architecture of trademark law hidden as it is considered inappropri-
ate for a judge to allow her moral sentiments to determine legal
winners and losers. Trademark’s decision makers take pains to
explain that moral considerations are irrelevant when assessing the
validity of a proposed mark or the likelihood of consumer
confusion.13 Even in the rare circumstance in which they hint at
application of a moral standard, judges take care to frame such
standards in an ambiguous and generalized manner that provides
little traction for a reader trying to map the contours of a judge’s
ethical reasoning.14
9. E.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010); see infra
Part III.B.
10. See infra Part IV.A. 
11. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(b) (2006); see infra Part IV.B.
12. One might also note that courts have deemed trademark counterfeiting a crime of
moral turpitude meriting deportation. See, e.g., Magasouba v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 13, 14-15
(1st Cir. 2008); Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2008).
13. See, e.g., Selfway, Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc., 579 F.2d 75, 79 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
(“The law pertaining to registration of trademarks does not regulate all aspects of business
morality.”).
14. For example, courts have defined unfair competition regarding trademarks as
performing acts contrary to “good conscience,” Pennwalt Corp. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 434
F. Supp. 758, 765 (D.N.J. 1977), selling goods “by means that shock the judicial senses,” Leon
Finker, Inc. v. Schlussel, 469 F. Supp. 674, 680 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979),
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Notwithstanding this lack of transparency, it is possible to
identify the moral reasoning employed by judges in trademark
disputes, for a couple of reasons. First, the boundary between law
and morality in trademark is not watertight. Recent research in the
field of moral psychology identifies a particular cognitive structure
at play when people render moral judgment.15 Psychologists have
also pinpointed five foundations of moral concern, subject areas that
are likely to trigger intuitive moral judgment in place of reasoned
deliberation.16 Despite judicial protestations to the contrary,
analyses of legal decision making suggest that moral heuristics
often guide doctrinal decisions.17
Second, there is a continuity to the moral concerns surrounding
trademark law that makes their presence and significance easier to
identify. This Article concentrates on trademark jurisprudence at
engaging in “activity which ... so ... violates standards of commercial morality that it cannot
be tolerated,” Wilson v. Electro Marine Sys., Inc., 915 F.2d 1110, 1118 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting
People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat’l Research Co. of Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962))
(internal quotation marks omitted), and “a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow,”
Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
15. See infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556,
1558 (2004). There has been little discussion of the moral concerns underpinning modern
trademark law, but scholars have been devoting increasing attention to the moral analysis
behind property rights. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2006 (2009); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality
of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2007); Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1902-03 (2007); see also Vincent Chiappetta, Living
with Patents: Insights from Patent Misuse, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 47 n.206 (2011)
(discussing nonefficiency concerns animating patent law). A recent article by Jeremy Sheff
applies the Kantian “contractarian” tradition in philosophy to trademark law. Jeremy N.
Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 761, 763 & n.2 (2013). Sheff’s article is
prescriptive, suggesting a new philosophical framework to replace the utilitarian search costs
model that currently dominates trademark law. Id. at 761, 763. Sheff’s model is quite valuable
in that it offers a different normative frame for those interested in trademark theory and
concerned about the shortcomings of the status quo’s reliance on law and economics. This
Article is different, however, in that it provides a descriptive account of the current state of
judicial decision making in trademark law, rather than an aspirational theory. I am also
somewhat skeptical of the ability of judges and juries to apply Sheff’s Kantian model when
adjudicating trademark disputes. See infra Part I.C.2; see also Jonathan Haidt & Craig
Joseph, The Moral Mind: How Five Sets of Innate Intuitions Guide the Development of Many
Culture-Specific Virtues, and Perhaps Even Modules, in 3 THE INNATE MIND: FOUNDATIONS
AND THE FUTURE 367, 369-71 (Peter Carruthers et al. eds., 2007) (maintaining that Kantian
theory does not resemble the emotional way human beings actually render moral judgments).
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two particular time periods: the beginning of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries. The beginning of the twentieth century
represented a watershed moment in American trademark law,
which morphed from a primitive, rarely consulted area of the law
into a major economic guidepost for a new mass commercial
society.18 Courts in this formative period were less squeamish than
their successors about using moral principles in decision making.19
This was a time when technological and demographic change
disrupted antebellum commercial ethics.20 The general public was
aware of and concerned with the moral implications of business
behavior.21 Into this uncertain environment, business leaders,
religious authorities, and lawmakers announced new commercial
values.22 By showing that the same ethical approaches that shaped
trademark law at its beginnings also determine decisions a century
later, I hope to prove that these approaches form an unbroken, yet
largely unstated, bedrock of the law.
To that end, Part I of the Article examines the properties of moral
judgment and how they might be applied to legal decision making.
A raft of experimental research investigating moral intuition is just
beginning to come into focus, and it offers new insights into how all
humans, including judges, make decisions. Part II looks to one
particular moral construct identified by this research, the belief in
rewarding personal investment, and how it has shaped trademark
doctrine. Part III examines how courts, perhaps quite unknowingly,
use notions of sexual purity and propriety to pick winners and losers
in trademark disputes. Part IV studies the nationalist sentiments
that led to the creation of a territorial principle in trademark law as
well as prohibitions on particular marks deemed damaging to
national symbols. Early twentieth-century jurisprudence is the
starting point for all of these arguments. The doctrines it spawned
remain a part of American trademark law, even though they do
18. See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 38
N.M. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
19. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
21. SAUL ENGELBOURG, POWER AND MORALITY: AMERICAN BUSINESS ETHICS, 1840-1914,
at 46-49 (1980); Edward J. Balleisen, Private Cops on the Fraud Beat: The Limits of American
Business Self-Regulation, 1895-1932, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 113, 115 (2009).
22. See ENGELBOURG, supra note 21, at 4-5; infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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little to promote consumer welfare. The Article’s final Part main-
tains that moral intuition negatively influences trademark law and
this influence is, to some degree, inevitable. Nevertheless, the
quality of trademark decisions will be improved if judges articulate
their moral concerns instead of hiding them behind the language of
economic efficiency.
I. THE ROLE OF MORAL JUDGMENT IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING
A few things need to be mentioned about moral judgment before
turning to its particular use in trademark jurisprudence. As
explained in this Part, today’s judges disfavor explicit appeals to
morality.23 Nevertheless, moral sentiments likely play a significant
role in trademark jurisprudence. Moral foundations theory—a new
and influential model of human decision making based on psycho-
logical experiment—identifies five categories of innate, moral
concern central to our judgment.24 At times, these categories of
concern may form a moral intuition that guides legal decision
making without explicit mention or even conscious awareness.
These intuitions influence judicial behavior yet do not track the
consumer efficiency justification for modern trademark law. Parts
II, III, and IV offer three examples of trademark doctrine shaped by
these moral triggers.
A. What Is Morality?
In this Article, I am investigating a particular sort of legal
decision making that relies on moral intuition. Before detailing the
nature of trademark’s moral argument, I need to explain what I
mean by morality.25 You would surely get different definitions of
morality depending on whom you ask. One approach would be to ask
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 373-74.
25. I have tried to mostly use the term “moral” instead of the term “ethical.” “Ethical” is
Greek in origin and historically tended to refer to character and education. “Moral” comes
from Latin and referred more to law and customary practices. In common parlance, “ethical”
and “moral” conduct have come to describe the same thing, although one author suggests that
the media uses “ethics” to describe business practices and “morality” to refer to controversial
sexual behavior. DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES 63 (2006).
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a philosopher. One can divide moral philosophers into two catego-
ries: consequentialists and deontologists.26 The consequentialists
evaluate an action’s morality by studying its consequences.27 A
consequentialist philosopher like Jeremy Bentham might describe
morality as a system of rules of behavior designed to lead to optimal
social welfare.28 
By contrast, deontologists ignore results, focusing instead on the
act itself.29 This school of thought is most closely associated with the
philosopher Emanuel Kant.30 Kant believed that humans should be
guided in their actions by universally shared moral duties, not self-
interest.31 Actions that transgress these shared duties are wrong,
regardless of their consequences.32 Under the Kantian view of
morality, “the right” is prior to “the good.”33 The focus is on acts and
the mental state behind those acts, not on results.34 Moreover, Kant
maintained that moral conduct was not equivalent to emotional
conduct.35 To be “moral,” an act must be performed in the right
frame of mind.36 For Kant, truly moral action is not instinctual but
rather is performed out of a thoughtful consideration of duty.37
26. BUSINESS ETHICS: READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY 5 (W. Michael
Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 1984); Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 894-95 (2009). A potential third category is virtue
ethics, which looks to the character of the moral actor rather than rights or consequences in
interrogating behavior. See Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 8, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.
27. Claeys, supra note 26, at 895.
28. See Bernard Gert, The Definition of Morality, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 14, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/.
29. Claeys, supra note 26, at 894-95.
30. Id. at 895.
31. Bailey Kuklin, The Morality of Evolutionarily Self-Interested Rescues, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
453, 497-98 (2008).
32. See id.
33. Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrim-
ination Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1384 (2004); see
also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 299 & n.121 (1996) (contrasting the Kantian and Aristotelian view of
morality).
34. See Kuklin, supra note 31, at 497-98.
35. See Gregory Trianosky, Natural Affection and Responsibility for Character: A Critique
of Kantian Views of the Virtues, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 93, 94 (Owen Flanagan & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1990).
36. See id.
37. Id.
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Another common definition of morality relies on religion.38 A
religious leader might equate morality with the particular tenets of
her religion, and people commonly describe religious teachings as
the foundation of morality.39 Yet this definition of morality seems
overly narrow. Even atheists hold certain values dear, and studies
reveal that both atheists and religious adherents arrive at the same
judgments when presented with various moral dilemmas.40
The larger problem with both the philosophical and the religious
definitions of moral conduct is that they represent the ideal rather
than the actual. Though we might want to evaluate every situation
with the perspicacity of a Kant or Bentham, this is impossible. Even
if we possess adequate philosophical tools to evaluate something in
the abstract, our decision-making powers differ in the context of the
real world.41 Kantian and utilitarian theories cannot fully explain
the behavior of judges who often act emotionally and may, like the
rest of us, lack the analytical tools to predict the full consequences
of their decisions. Similarly, religious teachings of what it means to
be a moral being are prescriptive, not descriptive. Anyone witness
to the downfalls of various television evangelists knows that
religion’s moral tenets are not always observed, even by their chief
proponents.42
38. MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS 410 (2006); Jonathan Haidt & Selin Kesebir,
Morality, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 797, 820 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 2010).
39. John Hare, Religion and Morality, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 1,
2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-morality (explaining that “religion and
morality have been closely intertwined” since “the beginning of Western thought”). 
40. John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future, 11
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 143, 144 (2007). For example, whether you ask a Christian, a
Muslim, or a nonbeliever, they all tend to agree that certain things should not be subject to
market-pricing mechanisms, even if such mechanisms could be proven to lead to greater
aggregate welfare. See A. Peter McGraw et al., From the Commercial to the Communal:
Reframing Taboo Trade-offs in Religious and Pharmaceutical Marketing, 39 J. CONSUMER
RES. 157, 169 (2012).
41. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 23 (2011) (explaining that humans
have a limited cognitive “budget” for making multiple decisions); Baba Shiv & Alexander
Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Consumer
Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 281 (1999) (suggesting that humans rely on
affective responses rather than cognitive decisions when “processing resources are
constrained”).
42. See, e.g., Robert E. Rains, Marriage in the Time of Internet Ministers: I Now Pronounce
You Married, but Who Am I to Do So?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 839-40 & n.284 (2010)
(rejecting “the notion that there is some sort of assurance that ministers or other clergy are
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Because this Article is focused on uncovering the process by which
judges decide morally tinged disputes, I want to use a different
definition of morality than the one employed by the philosophers
and religious scholars. Instead, my definition comes from psychol-
ogy. Rather than articulating what morality ought to be, moral
psychology asks what our shared morality really is.43 The moral
psychologist examines what actually triggers our moral sensibilities
and how we then go about making moral judgments.44 In other
words, the moral psychologist strives for a definition of morality
that tracks real-world behavior.
Until recently, the psychologists studying moral judgment defined
it fairly narrowly. One group identified morality strictly as care for
others.45 Another view limited the moral domain to questions of
“unfair” treatment.46 Under either approach, morality addressed
only interpersonal relations. Psychologists combined both views into
a single definition: “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and
welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other.”47
Other reported concerns, such as patriotism or sexual purity, that
do not directly relate to interactions with others, were viewed as
merely matters of social convention or personal choice, not moral-
ity.48 Hence, under the psychologists’ definition, only considerations
necessarily persons of integrity and responsibility” and noting sex abuse cases within the
Catholic Church).
43. Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38, at 797.
44. Gert, supra note 28.
45. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 19 (1982). 
46. This view stems mostly from Lawrence Kohlberg’s seminal work on moral reasoning.
See Jesse Graham et al., Ideology and Intuition in Moral Education 2 EUROPEAN J.
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 269, 273-74 (2008) (discussing Kohlberg’s importance to the field of
moral psychology and listing “fairness, equality, and justice” as his exclusive principles of
moral development). For examples of Kohlberg’s influential work, see Lawrence Kohlberg,
From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study
of Moral Development, in COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY 151, 154 (Theodore
Mischel ed., 1971); Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental
Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347, 347
(David A. Goslin ed., 1969).
47. ELLIOT TURIEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: MORALITY AND
CONVENTION 3 (1983); see also Jesse Graham et al., Mapping the Moral Domain, 101 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 366, 366-67 (2011) (noting that this definition has been “widely
cited” among psychologists).
48. Graham et al., supra note 47, at 367. Of course, sexuality usually implies interaction
2013] TRADEMARK MORALITY 97
of harm or justice to others could be considered part of one’s moral
makeup.49 
A flurry of recent experiments, however, has broadened our
understanding of morality. New research demonstrates that people
view other considerations besides failure to care for others as
worthy criteria for condemnation. Moral judgment and the emotion
of disgust are tightly linked.50 We often feel disgust at particular
behaviors, even when those behaviors can in no way be described as
harmful or unfair to any individual. Think of a scene in which
someone eats dinner off of a plate, one portion of which houses a
group of completely sterilized cockroaches.51 Our minds tell us that
such activity is simply wrong even if it poses no risk to the individ-
ual.52 Such findings have caused psychologists to adjust their
definition of morality in an attempt to include all concepts that
people believe are moral and trigger a particular mode of mental
analysis.
A more inclusive definition of morality comes from moral
foundations theory, an influential new development in evolutionary
and cultural psychology.53 Moral foundations theory identifies five
with others, but not always. Our moral judgment of others’ sexual behavior applies even to
strictly individualized conduct. See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture, and Morality,
or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 617-20, 625 (1993)
(describing subjects who identify the story of an individual purchasing a dead chicken and
having sexual relations with it as morally wrong).
49. Graham et al., supra note 47, at 367.
50. Paul Rozin et al., Disgust, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 757, 762-63 (Michael Lewis et
al. eds., 3d ed. 2008); Simone Schnall et al., Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment, 34
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1096, 1096-97 (2008); see also James Gorman, Survival’s
Ick Factor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at D1 (discussing the effects of the disgust emotion on
behavior).
51. Paul Rozin et al., Operation of the Laws of Sympathetic Magic in Disgust and Other
Domains, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 704-05 (1986).
52. See id. at 706-10.
53. Greg Miller, The Roots of Morality, 320 SCI. 734, 734 (2008) (chronicling “intense
interest” in moral foundations theory and related work); Christopher L. Suhler & Patricia
Churchland, Can Innate, Modular “Foundations” Explain Morality? Challenges for Haidt’s
Moral Foundations Theory, 23 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 2103, 2103 (2011) (describing the
theory as “an influential scientific account of morality”). In addition to shaping the
psychological literature, the theory has begun to influence scholarship in law, political science,
and public health. Jess Alderman et al., Understanding the Origins of Anger, Contempt, and
Disgust in Public Health Policy Disputes: Applying Moral Psychology to Harm Reduction
Debates, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 1, 3-4 (2010); Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust,
48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409 (2013); Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and
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areas of moral concern, common across cultures. According to the
theory, when conduct being evaluated falls under one of these five
categories, our moral sense is likely to be triggered and we will
evaluate the conduct in the particular cognitive style described
below. The five categories are described as (1) Harm/Care, (2)
Fairness/Reciprocity, (3) Purity/Sanctity, (4) Ingroup/Loyalty, and
(5) Authority/Respect.54 These same areas of moral intuition are
found in cultures across the world.55 They may not always be
equally valued, but they all influence the human judgment process. 
The Harm/Care category matches well with the modern justifica-
tion for trademark protection. Although not spoken of in moral
terms, modern trademark law’s stated reason for being is protecting
consumers from harmful, misleading signals in the marketplace.56
This justification fits the Harm/Care category, which praises caring
for others and condemns inflicting harm.57 If this were the only
category that triggered our moral sense, there would be little
disconnect between the consumer welfare justification that suppos-
edly guides modern trademark law and the moral sentiments
undergirding much of trademark doctrine. In many situations,
the Structural Role of the Supreme Court in U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 TUL. L. REV.
181, 201-03 (2011); Brad Jones, The Morality of Representation: Constituent Moral
Foundations and Position-Taking in Congress (Feb. 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2018491. A recent book describing the theory and its application to
political conflict, Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind, was a best seller of 2012 and touted
as “the most important book of the year.” Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Jonathan Haidt: He Knows
Why We Fight, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702
303830204577446512522582648.html.
54. See Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38, at 822; Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 381-85.
A sixth category of universal moral concern, Liberty/Oppression, has recently been proposed
and is being evaluated by scholars in the field. See Jesse Graham et al., Moral Foundations
Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism, 47 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 55, 85-87, 104 (2013).
55. Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 367.
56. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Hence, one might describe a judge’s self-
stated concern with “efficiency” or “search costs” in a trademark case as a type of “moral”
argument. There are two potential problems with this, however. First, judges do not recognize
arguments based on economic theory as the product of moral decision making; instead they
present such arguments as the result of conscious, logical deliberation. As described infra,
moral decision making involves a much less deliberative and self-aware process. Second,
efficiency analysis tends to obscure other, largely unstated, moral concerns that are relevant
not only to trademark law, but to legal decision making as a whole. See Joseph William
Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 904-06 (2009).
57. See Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38, at 822.
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however, the other areas of moral concern will trump the
Harm/Care category. The other four categories will be discussed in
detail later in the Article. For now, two things are worth noting: (1)
we routinely judge conduct based on these other moral foundations;
and (2) these moral judgments can extend to purely personal
behaviors. For example, someone may do something considered
impure, thereby committing a violation of the Purity/Sanctity
category, in the privacy of her own home without any deleterious
consequences to anyone else. Nevertheless, others will condemn that
action as immoral.58
B. Morality’s Current Disfavor in the Law
A candidate for a federal judgeship today is unlikely to mention
a strenuous reliance on these other moral foundations during the
confirmation process. This is because certain styles of legal argu-
ment are deemed more legitimate than others. Appeals to precedent,
statutory language, historical understandings at the time of
enactment, and the appropriate balance of relevant legal and
political institutions are all perceived as approved decision-making
techniques and relied on regularly to justify judicial outcomes.59
Rather than obscuring these techniques, their craftspersons make
their use open and notorious. This holds true across all types of
legal disputes, including decisions involving intellectual property
law.
Hence, the preferred emphasis in judging is on the mechanical
application of rules with little mention of judicial discretion.60 Legal
reasoning is typically described by those in the field as a special
skill of lawyers and judges involving the discernment and applica-
58. Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 384.
59. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 93-94
(1982); Gerald Torres, Social Movements and the Ethical Construction of Law, 37 CAP. U. L.
REV. 535, 540 (2009).
60. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“[A]nd I will remember that it’s my job to call balls
and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”); see also Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the
Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2006) (describing formalism as the
“conventional” and possibly “official” description of the modern judge’s role).
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tion of legal principles.61 These principles come from the law, not
outside sources. Most judicial opinions follow a set formula: the
judge canvasses applicable precedents, extracts the principle that
explains them, and then applies that principle to determine the
legal winner.62 To further support the winning principle, the judge
may note its policy advantages.63 This is where the search costs
justification for trademark law often enters written opinions.64 
By sharp contrast, modern opinions rarely appeal to a shared
morality.65 Even those who realistically acknowledge that there is
great discretion in evaluating precedent and that the judicial role
inevitably involves more than simply calling balls and strikes still
hesitate to openly acknowledge that moral principles have shaped
a legal outcome.66
As I will illustrate throughout the rest of this Article, this has not
always been true, at least in the area of trademark law. Earlier
courts were much more willing to tolerate some confusion and
inefficient behavior to uphold trademark values separate from
consumer protection.67 In its foundational period in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the moral sentiments
animating trademark doctrine became somewhat transparent.68
61. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 64-65 (2008).
62. Id. at 88.
63. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV. 423, 456 & n.122 (1988) (maintaining that statutory interpretation requires inquiries
into both legislative intent and the consequences from particular interpretations); Brian Z.
Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
469, 490 (2007) (“[J]udicial decisions today routinely cite policy considerations, consider the
purposes behind the law, and pay attention to law’s social consequences.”).
64. See Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 32-33 (1996). 
65. See BOBBITT, supra note 59, at 95 (discussing the absence of discussion of ethical
arguments in the teaching of constitutional law); Samuel Enoch Stumpf, The Moral Element
in Supreme Court Decisions, 6 VAND. L. REV. 41, 41 (1953) (describing a “manful resistance”
by judges to allowing “moral and ethical judgments into their decisions”); see also infra notes
298-300 and accompanying text (explaining how modern trademark law favors certain groups).
66. See BOBBITT, supra note 59, at 128. A place where moral argument may enjoy more
open support is in decisions involving constitutional recognition of unenumerated rights. See
Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1744 (2011); see also
infra notes 371-80 and accompanying text (explaining Philip Bobbitt’s framework for
employing moral arguments in constitutional law).
67. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1848 (2007).
68. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 431 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Early cases
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Treatise writers explicitly emphasized the salutary role of trade-
mark law in encouraging a higher standard of commercial morality
among businessmen.69 Rather than justifying the law as strictly
facilitating consumer efficiency, authorities explained that trade-
mark protections were justified by the need to promote honesty and
fair dealing.70 As one court of the time described it, the legal
standard for what can and cannot serve as a trademark derived
exclusively from “broad principles of morality and public law.”71
These comments in the legal literature were not simply geared
towards the instrumental goal of making businessmen more honest.
They also reflected a particular view of commercial morality that
drew its persuasive force from its supposedly nearly universal
acceptance.72
Modern trademark law has turned its back, however, on openly
invoking moral arguments. Judges frequently attempt to show
morality’s lack of influence by noting their own distaste for the
defendant yet simultaneously stating that the law in the area
requires ruling in the defendant’s favor.73 For example, in one case
involving a distiller that copied the distinctive packaging of a
famous whiskey producer, the court explained that “regardless of
how disapproving the courts may be of such practices, they cannot
dealing with the tort of palming off or passing off, which developed from the common law tort
of fraud and deceit, ‘imported a great deal of moral judgment into situations of trademark
infringement.’”); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:1 (4th ed. 2009).
69. See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, at vii (4th ed. 1924); HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR BUSINESS
COMPETITION, at iii-v (1909); PAUL STRUVEN, A TREATISE ON REGISTRATION OF TRADE MARKS
IN THE INDIVIDUAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES 24-25 (1934).
70. E.g., Piso Co. v. Voight, 4 Ohio N.P. 347, 348 (Super. Ct. 1897) (“The ground upon
which equity restrains the counterfeiting of trademarks is the promotion of honesty and fair
dealing.”); AMASA C. PAUL, THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS INCLUDING TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 13 (1903). 
71. Arbutnot, Latham & Co. v. Cage Drew Co., 6 Teiss. 374, 376 (La. Ct. App. 1909).
72. The early twentieth-century business community resented attempts by judges to force
compliance with general moral precepts, however. A familiar refrain of the time was “business
is business,” meaning that the business world had its own structural concerns and norms that
required moral specialization. ENGELBOURG, supra note 21, at 48. 
73. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 68, § 1:18; see, e.g., Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565,
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 848 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Phila. Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Quaker City Ice Cream Co., 159 A. 3, 6 (Pa. 1932).
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legislate the morals of the market place.”74 Another typical move is
to maintain that any ethical concerns must be ignored in favor of
decisions that further trademark law’s primary goal—the reduction
of consumer search costs. As one court explained in holding that a
plaintiff could not reduce its burden of proof by citing the inten-
tional nature of the defendant’s acts, “A defendant’s conduct,
whether legitimate or reprehensible, has only a tenuous connection
to the perceptions of consumers.”75 Despite evidence that moral
concerns routinely influence decision making, today’s courts portray
themselves as immune to such concerns when evaluating trademark
disputes.
C. Morality and Legal Decision Making
This section explains how, despite judicial protests to the
contrary, moral intuition influences legal decision making. First, I
describe the general psychology behind moral judgment. In many
circumstances, we do not rationally deliberate the pros and cons of
a particular action. This is often the case when we confront
questions of morality. When our moral sense is triggered, other
methods for rendering a decision tend to go out the window. Second,
I suggest that judges often rely on this particular mode of decision
making. Sometimes judges simply do not have the time or desire to
expend the mental resources to engage in a lengthy deliberative
process and, therefore, turn to emotion and readily available
heuristics. This is particularly likely when a situation to be judged
implicates one of the five areas of moral concern mentioned above.
1. Moral Judgment
Psychologists have uncovered a few hallmarks of moral decision
making. First, when our moral sense is triggered, it operates
implicitly and is used unreflectively.76 According to psychologist
74. Jack Daniel Distillery, Inc. v. Hoffman Distilling Co., 190 F. Supp. 841, 844 (W.D. Ky.
1960), aff’d, 298 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1962).
75. Cont’l Lab. Prods. Inc. v. Medax Int’l Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1012-13 (S.D. Cal.
2000).
76. Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38, at 802. Some would posit a greater role for
deliberative reasoning, see, e.g., Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in HEURISTICS
2013] TRADEMARK MORALITY 103
Daniel Kahneman’s influential work, two basic strategies are
available to us when making a decision.77 One is a systematic mode
that is effortful and analytic. This is a relatively slow process that
requires time and concentration.78 The other is a heuristic mode
that is relatively effortless as it prioritizes instinct over reasoned
deliberation.79 
The heuristic mode typifies moral judgment. Certain questions
are more likely to activate the heuristic mode than others. It
appears that for most individuals, moral dilemmas—scenarios
implicating one of the five moral categories—trigger this quick-
response system. Past research suggested that when we are
confronted with moral questions, systematic reasoning guides our
thought process. But this research made the mistake of accepting its
subjects’ descriptions of their decision-making process at face
value.80 When our moral sense is engaged, we have little chance,
after the fact, of accurately explaining why we judged a particular
event the way we did.81 As described by one cognitive scientist,
“[t]he mind adjudicates when it comes to moral dilemmas, but
guards its operative principles, leaving individuals to express
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 379, 380-84 (Thomas Gilovich et al.
eds., 2002), but the weight of the evidence suggests that intuition holds the upper hand in this
process. Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38, at 802.
77. KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 20-21. Psychologist Jonathan Haidt describes a similar
cognitive dyad, which he refers to as “seeing-that” and “reasoning-why.” JONATHAN HAIDT,
THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 41-48
(2012).
78. KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 22-23; Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2007); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and
Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1373 (2009).
79. KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 20-22.
80. JOHN MIKHAIL, ELEMENTS OF MORAL COGNITION 20-21 (2011); Jonathan Haidt & Craig
Joseph, Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable
Virtues, 133 DAEDALUS 55, 57 (2004). When confronted with certain hypothetical moral
dilemmas, people largely agree on the proper judgment, even if their professed reasons for
that judgment are logically incoherent. See, e.g., HAUSER, supra note 38, at 128-29 (noting
that one experiment suggests this, though more research is needed to verify this among other
groups).
81. Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38, at 805; see also HAUSER, supra note 38, at 156;
DANIEL KELLY, YUCK!: THE NATURE AND MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DISGUST 24 (2011)
(describing how, when the feeling of “moral disgust” is triggered, people will continue to
maintain the initial negative judgment even after admitting that they are unable to articulate
a compelling reason supporting that judgment).
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principles that provide either weak or incoherent support for their
judgment.”82 Without our awareness, a moral norm acquired
through cultural transmission becomes a part of us, and we are
intrinsically motivated to punish those who would break that
norm.83 A decision based on moral intuition often comes first and
preconsciously, and then is rationalized at a conscious level.84 Our
brains decide for us without being able to tell us why. 
Second, moral judgment is infused with emotion.85 Most decisions
that we label as “moral” do not involve Kantian or utilitarian
reasoning.86 As one psychologist notes, “Our moral sense hands us
emotional responses that motivate action, enabling judgments of
right or wrong, permissible or forbidden.”87 Strong emotions can
shift what would normally be a deliberative effort to determine
whether someone has violated a social convention into the more
intuitive moral decision-making process.88
Third, moral judgment does have criteria, even if those criteria
are not always accessible to our conscious mind. Although instinc-
tual, our moral instincts are guided by facts. Our moral faculty has
developed over thousands of years to become skilled at identifying
particular aspects of situations so as to punish cheaters and other
moral transgressors.89 The causal aspects of any scenario will be
82. HAUSER, supra note 38, at 126-27; see also Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38, at 805.
83. See generally Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Stephen Stich, A Framework for the
Psychology of Norms, in 2 THE INNATE MIND: CULTURE AND COGNITION 280 (Peter Carruthers
et al. eds., 2006) (explaining what norms are, how they originate, and how they affect
individuals).
84. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 817-18 (2001); see also HAUSER, supra
note 38, at 25 (“Conscious moral reasoning often plays no role in our moral judgments, and
in many cases reflects a post-hoc justification or rationalization of previously held biases or
beliefs.”).
85. JESSE J. PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS 22 (2007); Haidt &
Kesebir, supra note 38, at 803; Nancy Sherman, The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality,
in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 35, at
149, 150-54; see also WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 52 (2009)
(“The emotional power of our beliefs is often the main determinant in our decision making.”).
86. PRINZ, supra note 85, at 33; see also Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38, at 802. 
87. HAUSER, supra note 38, at 24.
88. See id. at 240.
89. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE
ADAPTED MIND 163, 163 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992).
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important in rendering an instant moral judgment.90 Likewise, the
actor’s perceived intent will inevitably shape our moral reaction,
perhaps even in situations in which intent should be largely
irrelevant because more formalized consequentialist thinking is
supposed to apply.91 This is manifest in trademark law, where the
perceived intent of the defendant remains a determinative factor in
infringement decisions despite its tenuous relationship to consumer
welfare.92
Fourth, moral decisions can be contingent on local tradition.
Instead of reasoning from first principles, people assess moral
sanction on the basis of cultural norms: “Cultural patterns become
internalized scripts and habits that are rarely consciously noted; if
noted, rarely questioned; and if questioned, rarely energetically
refuted.”93 Although the five categories of moral concern operate in
every society, their specific content and relative salience can vary
depending on culture.94 For example, within the United States, due
to historical circumstance, Northerners and Southerners have
developed different moral judgments for when aggressive acts of
self-defense are warranted. These judgments have even been
translated into particular local laws.95
Finally, although many of us would like to envision ourselves as
steadfastly obeying a consistent moral code, our moral decisions are
highly dependent on context. People judge certain acts more or less
harshly depending on surrounding cues.96 Just to take one example,
90. KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 110 (describing certain causal judgments as part of our
heuristic mode of thinking); see also Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing
Infringement, 64 VAND. L. REV. 675, 704-18 (2011) (urging courts to formalize their intuitive
reliance on causal reasoning in contributory infringement jurisprudence).
91. HAUSER, supra note 38, at 264; Miller, supra note 53, at 736.
92. See infra Part II.B.
93. Joseph A. Vandello & Dov Cohen, When Believing Is Seeing: Sustaining Norms of
Violence in Cultures of Honor, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CULTURE 281, 299
(Mark Schaller & Christian S. Crandall eds., 2004).
94. HAUSER, supra note 38, at 298-99, 422; KELLY, supra note 81, at 93.
95. RICHARD E. NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 60-65 (1996). There are also gender differences in moral constructs,
with some evidence that men tend to have their moral sense triggered more by the
Fairness/Reciprocity moral cluster, whereas women focus more on the Care/Harm cluster. See
Owen Flanagan & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Introduction to IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND
MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 35, at 1, 8. 
96. DAVID BROOKS, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 282 (2011); KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 370. For
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people render harsher moral judgments in dirty or smelly rooms
than they do in environments that are clean or odor free.97 Hence,
the way in which acts are presented for judgment can determine
whether our moral sense is activated.
2. Effect on Judges
Even if the description of the mechanics behind moral judgment
offered above is accepted, one might argue that judges avoid such an
approach. Their education, their specialized legal training, and their
recognition of the importance of the issues before them may allow
them to take a different cognitive path in rendering judgment.
Judging is often described as a “craft,” requiring the specialized
ability to reason through analogy and uncover governing principles
through close examination of past cases.98 Under this view, respect
for precedent will compel a judge to render decisions that clash with
her own preferred outcomes and personal moral sentiments.99
In some situations, the systematic mode will prevail. Judges will
naturally want to be accurate and to arrive at the “correct” decision.
Some cases may be particularly important because of the
pathbreaking nature of the case, the amount of money at stake, or
the severity of the potential punishment. In such situations, we can
expect judges to engage in reasoned deliberation, making difficult
example, in one study, subjects were taught under hypnosis to feel disgust when they came
across emotionally neutral words like “take” or “often.” Then, when primed with these words,
they punished particular moral infractions more severely than a control group for which
“take” and “often” retained their normal valence. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN
ETHICS 86-87 (2008); Thalia Wheatly & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral
Judgments More Severe, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 780 (2005).
97. KELLY, supra note 81, at 25-26; Schnall et al., supra note 50, at 1096; see also Shai
Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
6889 (2011) (documenting different decisions of an Israeli parole board based on whether
board members ate before making a decision); Robert Kurzban et al., Audience Effects on
Moralistic Punishment, 28 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 81 (2007) (finding that the presence
of an audience causes an increase in moralistic punishment).
98. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 61, at 2-3; Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54
VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2271-77 (2001).
99. See Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial Behavior: Expanding the Scope of
Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 3, 7 (David Klein & Gregory
Mitchell eds., 2010); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 163-77
(1998).
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comparisons with other cases and concepts, synthesizing informa-
tion, and, to the best of their ability, predicting the larger conse-
quences of their decision.100 
In other situations, however, judges employ the heuristic mode.
Everyone, including judges, has cognitive limits, and this can
influence when they adopt a particular decision-making strategy.101
Sometimes it is not clear what judicial outcome best furthers a
particular policy interest.102 One response to such cognitive limits is
to rely on heuristics that limit the complex cognitive work necessary
to reach a decision. There is no reason to think that judges never
engage in these affective strategies, particularly when confronted
with crowded dockets and a limited number of resources to deal
with them.103
Judges can also be influenced by what psychologists describe as
the defense motivation—“an orientation toward reinforcing
important self-related beliefs.”104 Emily Sherwin makes a compelling
case that judges routinely engage in motivated reasoning, with a
moral heuristic representing the first part of their analysis. As she
100. It should be noted that, even when the systematic mode of decision making is engaged,
a number of cognitive biases are likely to distort this process. Judges, like other decision
makers, are apt to focus too intently on the facts at hand and, thereby, give insufficient
attention to the future implications of a legal decision in different contexts. See Frederick
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 885-86 (2006); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 177-78 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982). 
101. See C.K. Rowland et al., Every Jury Trial Is a Bench Trial: Judicial Engineering of
Jury Disputes, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 99, at 183, 192;
Shiv & Fedorikhin, supra note 41, at 286, 288.
102. This may especially be the case with intellectual property regulation, including
trademark law, whose costs and benefits are notoriously hard to quantify. See, e.g., Jeremy
N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1311-13 (2011) (maintaining that it is
impossible to empirically assess the balance between consumer welfare losses from
psychological manipulation by trademark owners versus the administrative and error costs
of attempting to regulate such manipulation). 
103. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 99, at 8-9; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009).
104. Shelly Chaiken et al., Beyond Accuracy: Defense and Impression Motives in Heuristic
and Systematic Information Processing, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACTION: LINKING COGNITION
AND MOTIVATION TO BEHAVIOR 553, 554 (Peter M. Gollwitzer & John A. Bargh eds., 1996);
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990); see Hugo
Mercier & Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason?: Arguments for an Argumentative Theory,
34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 57, 72-73 (2011).
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explains, “[T]he reasoner constructs a tentative moral principle
applicable to the problem at hand, then tests the principle against
moral intuitions about particular instances within the principle’s
scope and against background theories about the world at large.”105
Judges make adjustments to resolve conflicts until the conflicts are
satisfactorily addressed and a principle emerges that resolves the
case.106 Importantly, the process Sherwin describes begins with a
moral principle.107 Thus, judicial outcomes may be greatly depend-
ent on a particular cognitive starting point: moral intuition.
Moreover, the decision maker’s initial moral stance may not be as
tentative as Sherwin and others suggest. If a legal dispute activates
the judge’s sense of self, a defense motivation is likely to kick in.108
Given that moral beliefs often form the core of our identities, judges
will be more likely to engage in directed reasoning in cases implicat-
ing one of the five moral foundations.109 Legal decision makers may
believe they are merely responding to accuracy concerns because: 
[They] do not realize that the process is biased by their goals,
that they are accessing only a subset of their relevant knowl-
edge, that they would probably access different beliefs and rules
in the presence of different directional goals, and that they
might even be capable of justifying opposite conclusions on
different occasions.110
105. Emily Sherwin, Features of Judicial Reasoning, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING, supra note 99, at 121-22. 
106. Id. at 122.
107. Id.
108. See Baum, supra note 99, at 17.
109. For example, when the emotion of “disgust,” which has ties to the Purity/Sanctity
moral category, is triggered, the effects are powerful enough that “people will maintain their
negative judgment of the object of evaluation even when they admit that, by their own lights,
they are unable to articulate any good reasons supporting that negative evaluation.” KELLY,
supra note 81, at 24.
110. Rowland, supra note 101, at 194; see also Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward
an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased
Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 297-98 (1987)
(“Rather than viewing cognitive bias as a result of the affective consequences of various
cognitive configurations [some theorists] view it as a consequence of the dispassionate
workings of the cognitive system.”).
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One might continue to argue that judges, on the alert for the
influence of moral intuition, can do a better job than the rest of us
in rerouting their decision making to a more systematic, deliberate
process. Admittedly, few studies have examined judges’ compliance
with moral norms. But evidence suggests that judges do not always
have conscious awareness of the motives guiding their behavior.111 
A good example of the proven influence of moral intuition in the
legal decision-making process comes from a study involving
purported harms from vaccines and birth control pills.112 Subjects
read different versions of a hypothetical case in which an individual
consumer was harmed by the item of manufacture, and then asked
whether the manufacturer should be fined.113 In some versions, the
subjects were informed that issuing a penalty against the manufac-
turer would make the manufacturer likely to stop making the
product altogether, thereby resulting in less safe products on the
market.114 In other versions, subjects were told that the result of a
penalty would be that the manufacturer would work harder in the
future to make a safer product.115 Most of the subjects surveyed,
including a number of judges, called for the same penalty for both
versions of the case.116 This suggests that the judges did not notice
or did not pay attention to the issue of incentives or even of
aggregate welfare. Cass Sunstein argues that instead the study’s
participants applied what he calls an “outrage heuristic.”117 Instead
of evaluating the future effects of a particular legal outcome, the
decision maker mandates a punishment proportional to her own
sense of outrage.118 In other words, the punishment is based on
moral intuition. We can see this as an example of moral judgment
short-circuiting the more deliberative process, which might be used
to decide other, less emotionally charged questions.
111. See Baum, supra note 99, at 13; see also David G. Winter, Personality and Political
Behavior, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 110, 121 (David O. Sears et al.
eds., 2003) (“[M]otives often operate at an implicit or even unconscious level–partly because
people may not attend to or verbalize the long-term trends of their actions.”).
112. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the
Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 17 (1993).
113. Id. at 21-23.
114. Id. at 23.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 23-24.
117. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 538 (2009).
118. Id.
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Of course, the scaffolding judges erect to justify their decisions
does not describe their use of the heuristic mode. In their opinions,
judges are usually careful to offer the appearance of lengthy,
reasoned deliberation. The public expectation is for the traditional
techniques of legal reasoning to bear the greatest weight in the
decision-making process, and any judicial announcement of judg-
ment will reflect the same.119 Hence, a surface view of judicial texts
shows legal issues decided strictly according to statutory language,
the closest applicable precedent, and information on the historical
intent of legislative actors. The weight of the evidence suggests,
however, that this is often an after-the-fact process in which the
morally motivated judge selectively picks nonmoral evidence to
justify an instinctual decision.120 Judges, particularly in the
intellectual property context, are uncomfortable making morality an
explicit part of their opinions. But it is there. 
II. DETECTING UNFAIRNESS
Having sketched out the basic contours of moral judgment and its
potential influence on legal decision making, I now turn to identify-
ing some important areas where these phenomena have influenced
trademark doctrine. These areas of doctrinal development, despite
their basis in moral intuition, have withstood time and the switch
to the consumer efficiency rationale. One moral norm critical to
shaping trademark law is the belief that fairness requires a respect
for personal investment. Courts privilege competitors that can
demonstrate their own investment in the marketplace, even though
this investment is largely irrelevant to the question of consumer
119. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 61, at 2-3; see also Brian Leiter, Heidegger and
the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253, 257 (1996) (describing general public
satisfaction with the perceived methods of judicial decision making).
120. Of course, other considerations besides moral intuition and traditional methods of
legal reasoning may influence judicial decision making. No doubt strategic behavior is part
of the judicial process. Judges may factor in the reactions of various audiences—their
colleagues, other political branches, the general public—in deciding cases as well. See Baum,
supra note 99, at 6; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 99, at 164-65; see also Benjamin Weiser,
Judge in Madoff Case Recalls Rationale Behind a 150-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2011, at  A1, available  at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judge-denny-chin-re
counts-his-thoughts-in-bernard-madoff-sentencing.html (recounting the sentencing judge’s
efforts to sentence Bernard Madoff to a symbolically appropriate sentence).
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welfare. On the other hand, when the evidence suggests an intent
to piggyback on the work of others, courts punish economic actors.
A. Personal Investment and Moral Nature
As explained in Part I, psychologists have identified four addi-
tional categories of moral concern apart from the Harm/Care
category.121 The Fairness/Reciprocity moral foundation implicates
those situations in which an inequity is perceived. Over the
centuries, humans have developed a rapid-fire capacity for detecting
cheaters—those who have somehow entered into and violated a
social contract.122 Research shows that humans are not only good at
detecting inequity, but they respond to it with great emotion.123 An
offer perceived to be “unfair” activates the same portions of the
brain that respond to feelings of disgust.124 In other words, we are
hardwired to find cheaters revolting. But who is a cheater? The
Fairness/Reciprocity intuition can be triggered when actors enjoy
rewards disproportionate to their actual contributions, as well as by
scenarios denying similarly situated individuals equal opportuni-
ties.125 American history and culture have further shaped the
Fairness/Reciprocity intuition in this country, leading to activation
of our moral sense in particular circumstances. In the late nine-
teenth century, when American trademark law entered its forma-
tive period, the competitive marketplace, with its potential for both
economic success and financial trickery, became the site of a
character formation process.126 In navigating this process, “the
young American was told he must assume complete command of his
own moral destiny by forming his own character from within.”127 Not
121. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
122. HAUSER, supra note 38, at 276.
123. Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 382-83.
124. HAUSER, supra note 38, at 287.
125. HAIDT, supra note 77, at 136-38.
126. See KAREN HALTTUNEN, CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN: A STUDY OF MIDDLE-
CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA, 1830-1870, at 25-31 (1982). For example, early antipathy to life
insurance was due, in part, to the belief that it was incompatible with the character formation
process offered by the marketplace. VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (1979).
127. HALTTUNEN, supra note 126, at 25 (1982); see also BROOKS, supra note 96, at 125
(describing how “Victorian moralists” focused on the ability of “upstanding people” to repress
and control their temptations); RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED 395 (2011) (linking business
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just captains of industry, but even members of the nascent con-
sumer movement assumed that the marketplace served an impor-
tant role in the moral development of its participants.128 Some
economic moralists emphasized the marketplace’s role in teaching
the virtue of self-denial.129 Teddy Roosevelt was representative of
many in that he believed in an economic world that produced people
with the vigorous virtues of self-reliance and initiative.130 Discus-
sions of competitive freedom at the time linked economic liberty
with personal liberty; they were considered equally essential to
individual growth.131 Because participation in the marketplace
conferred personal and spiritual benefits,132 any denial of the ability
to participate raised serious fairness concerns.133
In this period, people typically viewed material success as an
accurate gauge of a man’s hard work and self-restraint.134 Religious
authorities linked commercial accomplishment with moral
triumph.135 But, if further scrutiny revealed that this success was
behavior with “manhood” and “character” in the late nineteenth-century view). 
128. See LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, BUYING POWER: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM IN
AMERICA 5, 23 (2009). There were some anticapitalist critics to be sure, but, in general, people
saw business as a neutral field for personal striving and heroic endeavor, and not overly
influenced by its corporate interests. See ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF
AMERICA: CULTURE & SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE 5 (1982); see also ENGELBOURG, supra note
21, at 28 (“The belief in the morality of businessmen coming together for their mutual benefit
endured as the dominant value and was implicitly sanctioned by society despite the strictures
of common law.”); JAMES W. KUHN & IVAR BERG, VALUES IN A BUSINESS SOCIETY: ISSUES &
ANALYSES 106-07 (1968) (“The public accepted without much question the businessman’s
theory of a self-regulating economy, paying little attention to the inconsistency between this
theory and the business community’s opportunistic practices.”).
129. DONALD E. FREY, AMERICA’S ECONOMIC MORALISTS: A HISTORY OF RIVAL ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 91 (2009); WHITE, supra note 127, at 250 (describing the “Victorian attitude of
manhood defined by control and self-restraint that [some] thought should inform commercial
life”).
130. BROOKS, supra note 96, at 333.
131. See ROBERT GREEN MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE
2-3 (1951).
132. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. MAX RADIN, MANNERS AND MORALS OF BUSINESS 143-44 (1939) (“To prevent a man
from competing was at the beginning of the modern era a wrongful act because it violated his
fundamental and rational right.”). 
134. See DONALD MCCONNELL, ECONOMIC VIRTUES IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY AND
AN INTERPRETATION 147-48 (1973).
135. See id. at 148; RADIN, supra note 133, at 175. In some sermons, God was described as
a businessman and as the investing partner of other businessmen. ZELIZER, supra note 126,
at 150; see REINHARD BENDIX, WORK AND AUTHORITY IN INDUSTRY 257 (1956); SIGMUND
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simply the product of inheritance or good fortune, then the individ-
ual had no claim to the moral high ground.136 Even titans of
industry could find themselves under attack when it appeared that
their success owed more to a family bequest or unscrupulous
behavior than to the virtues that were taught by economic competi-
tion.137 The “contract” between individuals and the rest of society
was that the individual had to personally invest in the economic
sphere before he could enjoy the material and spiritual benefits of
the marketplace. An actor that profited from the marketplace but
invested nothing of himself was a cheater and could not claim the
moral blessings of economic competition.138 Trademark law reflects
this perceived link between personal investment and moral
character. Two examples follow. First, by fixating on and broadly
defining a trademark defendant’s culpable intent, judges reveal
their desire to punish freeriders—those who do not personally
participate in the character-building function of the marketplace.
Second, by privileging the use of personal names by trademark
DIAMOND, THE REPUTATION OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN 77 (1955). Bruce Barton’s 1925
best seller, The Man Nobody Knows, depicted Jesus as “the founder of modern business.”
BRUCE BARTON, THE MAN NOBODY KNOWS 159 (1925). The point of such sermons was to wed
material and spiritual advancement. Failures to achieve wealth were often described as moral
shortcomings. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 17 (1984); DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 162 (2002).
136. See MCCONNELL, supra note 134, at 76; see also Rudolf Callmann, What Is Unfair
Competition?, 28 GEO. L.J. 585, 599-601 (1940) (distinguishing, for purposes of unfair
competition law, between illegal “non-constructive effort” and legal “constructive effort” in the
struggles of the post-industrial business world).
137. See MCCONNELL, supra note 134, at 76; see also WHITE, supra note 127, at 253
(describing “Robber Baron literature” that criticized those who amassed fortune due to
political corruption rather than individual virtue).
138. Evidence of this attitude can be found in the regulation of gambling in the late 1800s.
American courts of the late nineteenth century were particularly concerned with the harmful
social and economic effects of gambling. Almost every state had a law outlawing wagering. As
one state supreme court remarked: “[B]y legislation and judicial decision, the hostility to
wagers of every nature has been marked.... Wagers are inconsistent with the established
interests of society, and in conflict with the morals of the age; and, as such, they are void, as
against public policy.” Bernhard v. Taylor, 31 P. 968, 968 (Or. 1893). The problem with
gambling was that it involved no productive activity of its own and discouraged the sober
Puritan virtues of industriousness and prudence. Someone might put up only a small amount
of money and achieve a large payday. This upset the typical assumption that a man’s wealth
was proportional to his industry. See ZELIZER, supra note 126, at 81; Edward J. Balleisen,
Vulture Capitalism in Antebellum America: The 1841 Federal Bankruptcy Act and the
Exploitation of Financial Distress, 70 BUS. HIST. REV. 473, 511-12 (1996). 
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defendants, courts rank autonomy and reciprocity concerns over the
protection of consumers.
B. Intent
In trademark claims involving infringement, dilution, and
secondary liability, judges make the defendant’s intent central to
their overall assessment of liability. Moreover, courts define
culpable intent more broadly than necessary to fulfill the professed
informational efficiency goal of trademark law. 
It was not always so. A number of late nineteenth-century courts
initially maintained that a judge must consider only what a
trademark defendant did, not what he intended.139 As time went on,
however, the courts with the winning argument were those that
found bad faith not essential, but extremely important in determi-
nations of trademark infringement. Supreme Court rulings on
trademark law cemented the importance of intent to infringement
analysis.140 
Early twentieth-century judges not only committed trademark
law to an inquiry into the defendant’s intent, but also broadly
defined what sort of mental state should be relevant to determining
liability. Trademark judges define probative intent in two different
139. See, e.g., Kann v. Diamond Steel Co., 89 F. 706, 712-13 (8th Cir. 1898); Wirtz v. Eagle
Bottling Co., 24 A. 658, 659 (N.J. 1892) (“The legal quality of an act, resulting in injury, must
be decided, not by the motive with which it was done, but by the consequences which have
necessarily resulted from it.”); see also NIMS, supra note 69, at 45-51 (collecting cases holding
that proof of intent was immaterial to determining infringement); Thomas L. Casagrande, A
Verdict for Your Thoughts?: Why an Accused Trademark Infringer’s Intent Has No Place in
Likelihood of Confusion Analysis, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1447, 1451 (2011) (describing how
mid-twentieth-century courts “generally focused more on the defendant’s actions and their
effects on consumers than the defendant’s intention itself”). In the late nineteenth century,
courts often distinguished between “technical trademarks,” which applied arbitrary or fanciful
terms to products, and “trade names,” which employed surnames, geographic terms, or
descriptive terms to identify products. For the most part, courts would require proof of intent
in trade name cases but not in cases involving technical trademarks. McKenna, supra note
67, at 1862. Courts abandoned the distinction between technical trademarks and trade names
in the early twentieth century. Bartholomew, supra note 18, at 9-10.
140. See, e.g., Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901) (holding that
suits for certain infringement actions require that “such circumstances must be made out as
will show wrongful intent”); Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 549 (1891)
(requiring proof of “intent, on the part of the defendant, to avail itself of the reputation of the
plaintiff”).
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ways. Under one view, intent means that the defendant must intend
to deceive consumers.141 This definition arguably tracks the search
costs justification for trademark protection by targeting only those
situations in which the defendant meant to disrupt consumer
expectations. The theory is that if the defendant meant to confuse
consumers, then this indicates that the defendant was successful in
confusing consumers.142
But another definition of intent suggests that courts are applying
a moral standard in the likelihood of confusion analysis, rather
than attempting to predict consumer reaction. This view of intent
asks not whether the defendant meant to deceive consumers but
merely whether the defendant intended to benefit from the trade-
mark holder’s goodwill.143 This is a broader conception of bad faith
than the one described above. It includes situations in which the
defendant’s goal was not necessarily misaligned with consumer
interests.144 A business may intend to utilize the goodwill in
another’s trademark without intending to deceive consumers. It
may even intend to employ the goodwill of another brand in a way
that aids consumers. For example, a private label seller may
position its less expensive product on the shelf next to a product
bearing a brand name (think of the Walgreens brand of ibuprofen
parked next to Advil) in an intentional effort to utilize a consumer’s
recognition of the more established brand. Such conduct demon-
strates an intent to profit from the plaintiff’s mark, but not an
intent to fool shoppers into making a mistaken purchase. Hence, the
141. E.g., A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 226 (3d Cir.
2000) (describing the applicable standard as “intent to confuse”); Streetwise Maps, Inc. v.
VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 745 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The intent to compete by imitating the
successful features of another’s product is vastly different from the intent to deceive
purchasers as to the source of the product.”).
142. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 68, § 23:124 (“[I]t is not often that a business person
intentionally sets out to divert sales from a competitor by confusing customers, yet is so inept
that it fails to achieve its goal.”).
143. Courts also consider an intent to profit off the goodwill of a trademark owner in
determining whether there has been an actionable “use” of a trademark, a determination
separate from the likelihood of confusion analysis. E.g., DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315
F.3d 932, 938-39 (8th Cir. 2003); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623-
24 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Margreth Barrett, Trademarks and Digital Technologies: “Use” on
the Net, 13 J. INTERNET L. 1, 10-11 (2010) (criticizing same).
144. See Michael Grynberg, The Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1283,
1319-20 (2011).
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second way of defining intent potentially implicates business
behaviors that help rather than harm or confuse consumers. 
Repeatedly, in assessing trademark infringement disputes, early
twentieth-century courts applied the second definition of intent,
citing defendants’ lack of industry and attempts to trade off of the
goodwill of another as reason for sanctioning their conduct. The
phrase “reaping where one has not sown” was used to justify many
decisions in favor of trademark plaintiffs in the early 1900s,145
including those of the Supreme Court.146 A good example comes from
the 1928 case of Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Listerated Co.147 In that
case, the defendant, a hair tonic producer, was enjoined from
advertising its product under the name “Listerated,” this being
judged an infringement of the plaintiff’s “Listerine” trademark. The
court seized on evidence that the defendant had “largely copied” the
defendant’s advertisements.148 To make matters worse, the defen-
dant’s product contained Listerine, albeit in small amounts. The
court opined that “only a blind man can fail to see that defendant
has deliberately set out to pirate plaintiff’s reputation, to reap
where it had not sown, and, like the cuckoo, to lay its eggs in the
nest of another bird.”149 Seemingly unconcerned that the two parties
operated in two very different markets—antiseptic mouthwash
versus hair tonic—the court condemned the defendant in biblical
terms. It stated that the defendant’s chosen name “conceived as it
was in business sin, and brought forth in business iniquity, cannot
145. See, e.g., Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Alexander B. Stewart Orgs., 50 F.2d 976, 980
(C.C.P.A. 1931); F.P. Kirkendall & Co. v. Mayer Boot & Shoe Co., 47 App. D.C. 245, 246 (D.C.
Cir. 1918); Flora v. Flora Shirt Co., 283 P. 1013, 1014 (Okla. 1930); M.M. Newcomer Co. v.
Newcomer’s New Store, 217 S.W. 822, 825 (Tenn. 1919); Robinson v. Robinson’s, Inc., 9 Tenn.
App. 103, 111 (1928); J.I. Case Plow Works v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 155 N.W. 128,
134 (Wis. 1915); see also Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA.
L. REV. 2099, 2113 & n.43 (2004) (cataloging use of “unjust enrichment rhetoric” in trademark
cases); Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the
Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 595, 612 (1942) (“[O]ne who has used his
intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a commercial product should be afforded
judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to reap where he has not sown.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
146. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 145 (1920); Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring).
147. 24 F.2d 122 (S.D. Tex. 1928).
148. Id. at 123.
149. Id.
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be cleansed of its original sin ... but that what is needed here is a
true regeneration, with a new christening, under a new name.”150 
This sort of judicial reasoning frustrates most intellectual
property scholars.151 After all, the presence or absence of personal
investment has little to do with reducing search costs for
consumers.152 Perhaps potential purchasers of hair tonic might see
a link between “Listerated” and “Listerine,” but the defendant’s lack
of industry does not really shed light on that issue. It takes a logical
leap to infer consumer confusion merely from a defendant’s intent
to benefit in some fashion from the plaintiff’s mark.153 In some
cases, including Lambert, the “reap/sow” language was used to find
against defendants not even in competition with the plaintiff.154
Under the search costs model of trademark law, what should be
important is consumer perception of a particular mark, not the hard
work, or lack thereof, of a business in developing that mark. If a
defendant is employing someone else’s trademark in a nonconfusing
manner, then it should not matter if she means to free ride off of the
trademark holder’s previous efforts.
If you look to modern trademark opinions, you might conclude
that today’s courts agree with the scholars and that decisions like
Lambert are outdated relics. Today, in evaluating claims of trade-
150. Id. In Lambert and other cases employing the “reap/sow” language, defendants were
held accountable for trying to use the goodwill built up in another’s mark instead of making
their own effort to create a brand from the ground up. This focus on personal investment
tracks the property rights theory of philosopher John Locke. Locke made a moral argument
that labor makes one “deserving” of property rights. Trading off of that labor without
performing labor yourself seems unjust. Labor should be rewarded with legal rights, whereas
a lack of labor should not. When the labor at issue is the plaintiff’s efforts to build up goodwill
in a brand, the defendant’s free riding off of that goodwill can appear inappropriate under
Locke’s theory and, hence, warrant a finding of infringement. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 68,
§ 24:21. As others have noted, this Lockean argument continues to animate modern
trademark law. See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent
Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117,
147-48 (2004); Sheff, supra note 17, at 768-74.
151. See, e.g., William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 199, 223 (1991); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032-33 (2005); McKenna, supra note 3, at 124-27.
152. See Bone, supra note 2, at 583-92, 616-21; Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 814-17 (1935).
153. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 1370-71 (2008); Mark P. McKenna, Testing
Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 116 (2009). 
154. See, e.g., Checker Cab Mfg. Corp. v. Sweeney, 197 N.Y.S. 284, 286 (1922). 
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mark infringement, courts apply a variety of judge-made factors in
determining whether a defendant’s use of a trademark is likely to
cause confusion. Almost all of these factors are directly related to
pinpointing what kinds of uses will cause a consumer to mistake the
defendant’s product for the plaintiff’s—the essential question in any
infringement action. For example, every federal circuit examines the
similarity between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marks, the
relatedness of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods, and the
sophistication of the relevant consumer base.155 These factors all
focus on the likely consequences of the defendant’s actions for
consumers. 
Another factor, universally applied, stands out, however. The
defendant’s intent is considered relevant to the question of con-
sumer confusion, even though it arguably has little bearing on how
a consumer perceives the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark.156
Some judges profess to care little for questions of intent, noting that
it is only one factor among many to be considered.157 Nevertheless,
no federal circuit has chosen to discard considerations of intent in
its confusion analysis.158 Moreover, empirical study of recent
decisions demonstrates the critical importance of intent to an
ultimate finding of infringement, even in those circuits that disclaim
its importance.159 Despite their public statements, courts continue
to construe intent in a broad manner that is unrelated to consumer
155. See, e.g., Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743-46 (2d Cir. 1998);
Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29-31 (1st Cir. 1989); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc.
v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977).
156. See, e.g., Casagrande, supra note 139, at 1447.
157. See, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003); Chrysler
Corp. v. Silva, 118 F.3d 56, 59 n.3 (1st Cir. 1997); T.A.B. Sys. v. PacTel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 1372,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875
(2d Cir. 1986).
158. Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Trademark Infringement Rules in Google Keyword Advertising,
89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 137, 161 (2012); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 68, § 23:19
(describing intent as a “foundational factor” that helps form “the basis for the various lists of
factors now required to be used by the various federal circuits”). One circuit treats evidence
of bad intent as triggering a rebuttable presumption in favor of the trademark holder. See
Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1991). 
159. See Beebe, supra note 8, at 1626-31; see also Casagrande, supra note 139, at 1453-54
(“[E]xperienced practitioners are well aware that intent remains one of the most—if not the
single most—critical of the confusion factors.”).
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protection or really any sort of utilitarian assessment of consumer
welfare.160
A good illustration of this phenomenon comes from cases
involving unauthorized use of university color schemes. In those
cases, courts have equated “intent to capitalize on the university’s
popularity” with an “intent to confuse consumers.”161 As one judge
explained, the defendants’ admission that they meant to “rely upon
the drawing power [of the university colors] in enticing fans of the
particular universities to purchase their shirts” was evidence of bad
faith.162 The judge also noted that the defendants had attempted to
take a “free ride” on the universities’ reputation.163 As it did a
century ago, this language may reflect a moral judgment of the
defendant’s “fairness” rather than a desire to eliminate inefficien-
cies for consumers. As others have pointed out, consumers typically
do not care whether merchandise featuring their favorite university
sports team is officially licensed by the university itself.164 Neverthe-
less, when a court perceives that the merchandiser intended to
profit from the university’s brand goodwill, the university will
typically succeed in its infringement claim.
Broad definitions of intent translate into judicial victories for
trademark holders. When the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and
Sciences sued the maker of a golden “Star Award” for infringing the
trademark in its “Oscar” statuette, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
court below and found a likelihood of confusion.165 It seems unlikely
160. In many modern cases, judges mention “free-riding” or its equivalent when discussing
the sort of culpable mental state relevant under the intent factor of the multi-factor likelihood
of confusion test. E.g., Comerica Inc. v. Fifth Third Bankcorp, 282 F. Supp. 2d 557, 573 (E.D.
Mich. 2003); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 419
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Estate of Jenkins v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714 (E.D.
Va. 2000), aff’d, 7 F. App’x 270 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Caliber Auto. Liquidators, Inc. v.
Premier Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge, LLC, 605 F.3d 931, 940 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must
determine whether the defendant adopted a plaintiff’s mark with the intention of deriving a
benefit from the plaintiff ’s business reputation.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Frehling Enters. v. Int’l Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1340 (11th Cir. 1999))).
161. See Stephanie Frank, Note, Showing Your School Spirit: Why University Color
Schemes and Indicia Do Not Deserve Trademark Protection, 92 B.U. L. REV. 329, 354 (2012). 
162. Bd. of Supervisors v. Smack Apparel Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 653, 661-63 (E.D. La. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008).
163. Id. at 660.
164. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413,
440-41 (2010).
165. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446,
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that anyone receiving a “Star Award” would think she had joined
the ranks of actual “Oscar” winners like Joan Fontaine and Spencer
Tracy, or that the makers of the “Star Award” meant to fool
purchasers into thinking that they were buying actual “Oscar”
statuettes. The “Star Award” was shorter than the “Oscar,” held a
star instead of a sword, and was primarily purchased by corporate
buyers as a reward for high performing salespersons.166 The Ninth
Circuit generously defined intent, however, faulting the court below
for making a false distinction between an intent to “associate the
Star Award with the Oscar” and an intent to “confuse purchasers.”167
Both types of intent, the Ninth Circuit explained, were probative of
a finding of trademark infringement.168
This broad conception of probative intent is not limited to
infringement actions. It is also evident in the relatively new cause
of action for federal trademark dilution as well as claims of second-
ary infringement. Just as the Ninth Circuit adopted a generous
view of intent for the likelihood of confusion analysis, the Second
Circuit has been similarly generous when it comes to dilution. In
Starbucks v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, the Second Circuit assessed
whether the court below had been too stingy in evaluating the type
of intent that could justify a dilution verdict.169 The trial court had
concluded that the defendant, by labeling one variety of its coffee
“Mr. Charbucks,” was trying to communicate to customers only that
this variety was a particularly dark roast; the indirect “Starbucks”
reference was merely an efficient shorthand given Starbucks’s
reputation for selling abnormally dark roasted coffee. As a result,
there could be no inference of bad intent.170 In the trial court’s view,
this was a nonactionable attempt to use the Starbucks name to
communicate something about a product’s characteristics, not an
attempt to hijack Starbucks’s customers. The Second Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that a mere “intent to associate” with Starbucks was
enough to infer bad faith.171 
1449, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991).
166. Id. at 1449-50.
167. Id. at 1456.
168. Id.
169. 588 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 2009).
170. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
171. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 109. Fixation on the intent factor can blind a court to the
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Intent, broadly defined, has also taken center stage in trade-
mark’s secondary infringement doctrine. Secondary infringement
allows for liability against intermediaries that do not directly
infringe trademarks themselves.172 Although secondary infringe-
ment cases often speak in the language of consequentialism and
consumer welfare, their outcomes can rely on judicial assessments
of the defendant’s character.173 For example, in an important case
evaluating secondary trademark liability against eBay for the
posting of infringing items on its auction website by third parties,
the Second Circuit spent a great deal of time discussing evidence of
eBay’s good faith.174 As Stacey Dogan has noted, even though it is
clear that eBay provides a potent forum for infringing activity, the
court’s concerns were sufficiently assuaged by evidence of eBay’s
“status as a legitimate business concern acting in good faith.”175
Evidence of eBay’s own anticounterfeiting measures went a long
way to convincing the court that eBay did not mean for infringement
to occur.176 Even though these measures were clearly inade-
quate—the court admitted that a large percentage of goods offered
under the TIFFANY mark on eBay were fakes—more important
were eBay’s own outlays and attitudes towards the marketplace.
The court emphasized the amount of money eBay had devoted to
rooting out fraud, thereby demonstrating the sort of investment that
parodic nature of the defendant’s use. Federal law explicitly exempts parodies from dilution
claims. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006). Nevertheless, when Hyundai aired a humorous
television commercial featuring, among other examples of misplaced luxury, an image of a
basketball emblazoned with a gaudy Louis Vuitton logo, a court granted summary judgment
for Louis Vuitton, holding that Hyundai was guilty of diluting Louis Vuitton’s mark. Louis
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 2012 WL 1022247, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). To justify its ruling, the court highlighted testimony from
Hyundai that it was “borrowing equity” from Louis Vuitton. Id. at *2. In other words, the
court set out to punish what it viewed as an unfair attempt to profit from the goodwill of
another brand, ignoring a statutory defense because of Hyundai’s perceived intent to free ride
off of the Louis Vuitton brand.
172. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103-05 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the
development of the doctrine of secondary liability for trademark infringement).
173. Stacey L. Dogan, “We Know It When We See It”: Intermediary Trademark Liability and
the Internet, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7, ¶ 3 (“In the end, what matters most in these cases
is whether the court believes in the defendant’s essential legitimacy and good faith.”).
174. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98-100.
175. Dogan, supra note 173, at ¶ 27.
176. See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98-100.
122 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:085
can help clear a defendant of liability for facilitating another’s
infringement.177
What all these analyses of intent—whether in infringement,
dilution, or secondary liability—demonstrate is the continued
importance of a now largely unspoken moral concern in trademark
law: the belief in rewarding personal investment and punishing
those who try to reap rewards from the efforts of others. The judicial
focus on intent does nothing to promote consumer efficiency.
Instead, the intent factor is a way for judges to justify a result when
their moral intuition tells them that the defendant has violated the
Fairness/Reciprocity foundation. When culpable intent is defined
broadly, as an intent to profit from the brand goodwill of another, it
serves as a proxy for the need for personal investment in the
marketplace.178 
C. Privileging Use of Personal Names
A trademark treatise writer in 1885 analogized participants in
the American economy to knights in a medieval tournament. “Each
man stands upon his own merits,” he wrote, “just as a knight at a
tourney has his own color to identify him with valor and high
emprise.”179 In this tournament, it was important for each partici-
pant to identify himself to all other competitors. Only then would he
be able to fully measure himself against others. Moreover, although
177. Id. at 97-98.
178. Intent is relevant in several other areas of trademark doctrine. The “good faith” of a
junior user is scrutinized to determine if the user should be allowed to continue to use its
mark in areas once remote from the senior user’s trade. See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal.
Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 692, 700 (5th Cir. 2001). In evaluating the descriptive fair use
defense to infringement, courts investigate whether the defendant intended to trade on the
goodwill of the mark owner. See, e.g., Int’l Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 456 F.3d 1270,
1274-75 (11th Cir. 2006). The Lanham Act also contains a provision against cybersquat-ting,
which specifically requires a court to investigate whether the domain name holder acted with
a “bad faith intent to profit” from the plaintiff ’s mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(I) (2006).
Courts also investigate intent when evaluating a trademark defendant’s First Amendment
defense. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 773-74 (8th Cir.
1994). Intent is perhaps more relevant in the determination of remedies than in any other
area of trademark law. A finding of willful intent is required for any claim for profits in the
Second Circuit and is necessary for an award of profits under the unjust enrichment theory
in the Ninth Circuit. Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 1996); Banff, Ltd.
v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1993).
179. WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS 66 (2d ed. 1898).
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a medieval knight was meant to live by a self-imposed code of
chivalry, the commercial cavaliers of the late nineteenth century
could not be trusted to police themselves. “Piracy must be restrained
by the iron grasp of justice, that laudable industry may flourish,”
proclaimed the treatise writer. It was for the courts to help set the
ethical boundaries of this tournament and “uphold a high mercan-
tile morality.”180 
In keeping with the idea that the marketplace was a place for
self-definition and that courts had a role in encouraging this
process, late nineteenth-century trademark law chose to recognize
an absolute right, even in the face of consumer confusion or
competitive injury, for citizens to use their own name for the
purposes of trade. Names are an obvious badge of identity, the
personal marker we most commonly use for self-presentation.181 The
doctrinal privileges afforded competitive use of personal names can
be explained by the moral argument that it was unfair to prevent
certain citizens from having the opportunity to shape themselves in
economic competitive struggle. 
In 1875, the New York Court of Appeals instructed that “every
man has the absolute right to use his own name in his own busi-
ness, even though he may thereby interfere with or injure the
business of another person bearing the same name.”182 In that case,
the plaintiffs’ mark, “Meneely,” had been in use since 1826 and had
“become a designation or trade mark of great celebrity and value to
the plaintiffs.”183 Use of the same name in the same type of business
in the same town by another person named Meneely, however, was
180. Id.; see also TRACHTENBERG, supra note 128, at 5 (maintaining that in the late 1800s,
“business was still thought of as a field of personal competition, of heroic endeavor, and not
of corporate manipulation”). 
181. Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 381
(2011) (“[W]e think about names in a very personal way, as a core part of our identity.”); Neal
Rendleman, False Names, 169 W. J. MED. 318, 320 (1998) (“The name is the identifier, the
badge of allegiance to family and group, and even a surrogate for identity itself.”).
182. Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427, 431 (1875); see also England v. N.Y. Publ’g Co., 8
Daly 375, 377 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl. 1878) (“It is well settled, as a general proposition, that a
person has the legal right to use his own name to designate an article produced and sold by
him, although another person of the same name has previously manufactured and sold the
like article with the same designation.”). As one prominent treatise noted, “[I]t is the opinion
of the ablest jurists that a person’s name cannot be an essential element of his trade-mark;
and such is the settled doctrine of the Patent Office.” BROWNE, supra note 179, at 213.
183. Meneely, 62 N.Y. at 427-28.
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not actionable under trademark law despite the consumer confusion
produced by such use.184 
Such a rule was not justified by prudential concerns. After all,
some consumers would inevitably fail to realize that the junior user
of the surname was unaffiliated with the senior user. In such
circumstances, the senior user was likely to lose some potential
sales and some purchasers were likely to buy from the defendant
while under the impression that they were trading with the
plaintiff. Rather, the privilege granted to use of personal names
stemmed from an ethical argument about the accoutrements of
personhood. Someone pursuing “the avocation of a lifetime in a
corporation” under her own name should not be blocked by an
infringement action.185 As one leading treatise of the time explained,
there was a shared belief in this country that the identity concerns
bound up in the right to use one’s own name in business should
trump other concerns: 
The general impression is prevalent that a man’s name, like his
house, is particularly his own; and an Englishman or American
is quick to resent any interference with such rights by the
courts. The common law has taught them that every man’s
house is called his castle.... And his name is more dear to him
than his house.186
 
The Supreme Court agreed, describing the right to use one’s name
in a business in the strongest of terms:
A man’s name is his own property, and he has the same right to
its use and enjoyment as he has to that of any other species of
property. If such use be a reasonable, honest and fair exercise of
such right, he is no more liable for the incidental damage he may
do a rival in trade than he would be for injury to his neighbor’s
property by the smoke issuing from his chimney, or for the fall
of his neighbor’s house by reason of necessary excavations upon
184. Id. at 432.
185. W.F. & John Barnes Co. v. Vandyck-Churchill Co., 207 F. 855, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1913),
aff’d, 213 F. 637 (2d Cir. 1914).
186. NIMS, supra note 69, at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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his own land. These and similar instances are cases of damnum
absque injuria.187
Reviewing Supreme Court precedent on this issue, the Second
Circuit noted in 1905 that the Court “has reasserted and reaffirmed
in clear and unequivocal language the right of every man to use his
own name in all legitimate ways.”188 Thus, from the outset, trade-
mark doctrine was structured in a way to bolster attempts to assert
one’s identity in the marketplace. One must have the right to use
one’s given name in business, even at the risk of collateral consumer
damage.189
The absolute privilege to use one’s own name in the marketplace,
even if that name confused others, waned over time. As the twenti-
eth century progressed, judges began to mention the competing
concern of consumer protection when evaluating whether a defen-
187. Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 544 (1891).
188. Von Faber-Castell v. Faber, 139 F. 257, 258 (2d Cir. 1905).
189. Strangely enough, even though the original rationale for the personal names privilege
was based on spiritual benefits for the individual, judges believed that competition’s moral
chastening could also apply to corporations. It was in this era that the legal system came to
identify the corporation as a person, with many of the same constitutional protections as
persons under U.S. law. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). In the
same period, courts evaluating trademark disputes blurred the line between corporate and
personal reputation. Judges vindicated corporations seeking injunctive relief for trademark
infringement not only on grounds of consumer confusion, but also in terms of a corporate right
to self-definition. For example, in considering a case brought by a corporation that
manufactured batteries, Judge Learned Hand described the mark YALE as “a reputation, like
a face” and “the symbol of its possessor and creator.” Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d
972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928). He went on to describe another entity’s appropriation of that mark
as donning “a mask,” implying not only that consumers might be confused by this disguise but
that the defendant was somehow disfiguring itself instead of forming a genuine identity in the
marketplace. Id. Hand maintained that this was an injury to the corporation that the law
must stop even if the defendant’s use did not divert any sales or tarnish the YALE mark in
any way. Id. Similarly, courts often described corporate trademarks as “one’s commercial
signature,” implying the same personal attributes manifested in an individual’s handwriting.
See, e.g., Leidersdorf v. Flint, 15 F. Cas. 260, 261 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1878) (No. 8219); PAUL, supra
note 70, at 5. In one case, the Supreme Court described a trademark as a corporation’s
“autograph,” implying a personal role for the moniker selected by a business to attract
customers and house its corporate goodwill. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273
U.S. 629, 630 (1927). Treating corporations like people helped preserve the idea of an
economic system that rewarded individual virtues. If a corporation was a person, then one
could envision corporations as mere individuals competing on the same basic playing field as
individual entrepreneurs. KUHN & BERG, supra note 128, at 221. And if they were equal
competitors, they also needed to be able to take advantage of not just the financial rewards
but the beneficial moral cleansing of the marketplace.
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dant accused of infringement should be permitted to use his own
name in business. Although still stressing the importance of being
able to use one’s own name, courts began to require defendants to
take precautions to prevent confusion.190 Many decisions required
the second user of a trademarked personal name to attach disclaim-
ers to its packaging or discontinue the use of confusing trade
dress.191 Courts continue to resolve personal name cases in the same
manner today.192 
Nevertheless, even though the courts’ protection of eponymous
business owners weakened after its early twentieth-century high-
water mark, the privilege for personal name use still remains an
important component of modern trademark law. Well into the
twentieth century, courts described the ability to use one’s own
name in business, despite the confusing presence of an identical
established trademark, as a “sacred right.”193 Through common law
decision making, a “personal names rule” emerged that raises
barriers on the trademarking of personal names. Under the rule,
personal names cannot be inherently distinctive. In other words, the
proponent of a mark based on someone’s name has to prove
secondary meaning in the minds of consumers before the mark can
be legally recognized.194 In effect, this results in businesses having
to wait years before they can trademark a personal name and even
then having to go through the costly process of documenting “an
association formed in the minds of consumers between the mark and
the source or origin of the product.”195 By contrast, other words or
190. E.g., L.E. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 94 (1914) (requiring junior
user to use the disclaimer “not connected with the L.E. Waterman Co.” on its packaging); see
also Walter Baker & Co. v. Sanders, 80 F. 889, 895 (2d Cir. 1897) (granting an injunction
requiring defendant to place upon its packages the words “W.H. Baker is distinct from and
has no connection with the old chocolate manufactory of Walter Baker & Company”).
191. See, e.g., Nat’l Distillers Prods. Corp. v. K. Taylor Distilling Co., 31 F. Supp. 611, 616
(E.D. Ky. 1940). 
192. See, e.g., Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, 569 F.2d 731, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1978);
Gucci v. Gucci Shops, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 916, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
193. See, e.g., Ida May Co. v. Ensign, 66 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Tomsky
v. Clark, 238 P. 950, 952 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925); Carson v. Harris, 242 S.W.2d 777, 780
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
194. See Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 989-90 (7th Cir. 2004); Brown v.
Quiniou, 744 F. Supp. 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
195. See Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1005 (8th
Cir. 2005). 
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symbols not involving personal names are eligible for trademark
protection immediately, before any evidence has developed that
consumers associate the proposed mark with its proponent.196
Even when a company does manage to prove secondary meaning
and receive trademark protection for a personal name, judges will
reduce the value of any verdict of infringement against a competitor
blessed with the same name, balancing the need to protect the
senior user and consumers from injury with the goal of facilitating
the use of personal names in business.197 When the plaintiff wins a
trademark infringement suit involving the defendant’s confusing
use of a personal name, only a limited injunction is granted. This
limited injunction permits continued use of the name in some form
along with a disclaimer.198 By sharp contrast, a successful infringe-
ment case not involving the defendant’s use of a personal name
usually results in an injunction completely preventing use of the
confusing term.199 More tailored relief in the form of continuing use
with a disclaimer is frowned on. In fact, in cases not involving
personal names, courts express great skepticism that disclaimers
can ever successfully prevent consumer confusion.200 Hence, courts
offer a half-remedy in personal names cases, one that permits more
residual confusion than in the typical successful infringement
action.
What is most striking is that the privilege afforded use of
personal names continues at all. Any privilege for use of personal
names comes at a cost for consumers. Consumers are likely to be
196. Under modern trademark doctrine, marks that are deemed “fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or
“suggestive” are “inherently distinctive,” and can enjoy full trademark rights without a
demonstration of secondary meaning. See Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 774 (11th Cir.
2010).
197. See cases cited supra note 194; see also, e.g., Paul Frank Indus., Inc. v. Sunich, 502 F.
Supp. 2d 1094, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“Because this case involves use of Mr. Sunich’s personal
name, the Court must tailor an appropriate injunction so as to limit use of the Paul Frank
name only to the extent necessary to avoid public confusion.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
198. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 68, § 13:9.
199. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 883-84 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
200. See, e.g., Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Luigino’s, 423 F.3d 137, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2005);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315 (2d Cir.
1987); Ohio State Univ. v. Thomas, 738 F. Supp. 2d 743, 755 (S.D. Ohio 2010); see also Mark
P. McKenna, Back to the Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion in Trademark Cases, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 537, 544-49 (2010) (describing prevailing judicial reluctance to tailor
injunctive relief in trademark suits).
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confused by simultaneous use of two personal names and senior
users are likely to suffer lost sales. Like the focus on intent, the
personal names privilege is hard to square with the efficiency
rationale for trademark protection typically voiced by modern
judges. If the privilege for competitive personal name use cannot be
defended in terms of consumer welfare, the real justification may lie
in a belief that it would be unfair to deprive individuals of the
spiritual and dignitary value of such uses.
III. MAINTAINING SEXUAL PURITY
Judges deciding trademark disputes are motivated by more than
fairness concerns. Sexual usage of a trademark triggers moral
judgment and leads to particular doctrinal rules. In the early
twentieth century, the introduction of sexuality into new com-
mercial environments provoked a legal backlash. Judges adjusted
the law of obscenity and slander to police and promote a particu-
lar vision of womanhood. Trademark law was invoked to prevent
mark uses that clashed with this chaste vision, particularly uses
suggesting sex outside of marriage. Concern with sexuality in the
marketplace still influences trademark decisions today. The best
evidence of this is trademark dilution law’s willingness to presume
tarnishment from sexual uses, but not from other uses equally likely
to harm mark reputation.201 
A. Biology, History, and Sexuality
Sexually related activity is a surefire way to trigger our moral
judgment.202 In fact, when asked to describe immoral behavior, the
first thoughts of many turn to intimate physical activity.203 Our
instinctive judgment of sexual activity stems from the
Purity/Sanctity moral foundation. This category derives from
intuitive concerns with physical and spiritual contagion. Humans
developed a variety of cognitive reactions to potential illness. These
201. See infra Part III.B.
202. Sunstein, supra note 117, at 540 (“Issues at the intersection of morality and sex
provide an obvious place for the use of moral heuristics.”).
203. Paul Rozin et al., Operation of the Sympathetic Magical Law of Contagion in
Interpersonal Attitudes Among Americans, 27 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC. 367, 367-70 (1989). 
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reactions were adaptive responses designed to keep individuals safe
from such threats as tainted meat and transmittable diseases. By
developing feelings of disgust when viewing such threats, humans
helped themselves live longer.204 Sexual activity, because of its
ability to transmit disease from one infected host to another, became
an especially likely prompt for feelings of disgust—at least when
signs of illness in a potential sexual partner were apparent. Because
of the importance of avoiding such threats, humans developed a hair
trigger response to perceived sexual impurities.205 
In time, various cultures further emphasized the need to avoid
contagion by separating the sacred from the profane and exhorting
followers to live in a more ascetic, less carnal manner.206 The result
is that sexual purity, which was originally rooted in simply evading
physical ailments, has become deeply moralized, causing many of us
to have real feelings of moral disgust towards conduct that cannot
possibly impact us or others.207
Historical context creates particularized sexual moral
intuitions.208 In the early 1900s, concern over sexuality weighed
heavily on the minds of Americans, both elites and the middle-class.
Historians describe this period as a watershed moment in the
history of sexual ideology and practice in the United States.209
Urbanization made family and local community constraints on
204. Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 384; Rozin et al., supra note 50, at 758.
205. KELLY, supra note 81, at 51. For example, when an object deemed unclean comes into
perceived contact with another clean object, the second object is deemed unclean as well.
Andrea C. Morales & Gavan J. Fitzsimons, Product Contagion: Changing Consumer
Evaluations Through Physical Contact with “Disgusting” Products, 44 J. MKTG. RES. 272, 272
(2007). This holds true even when the two objects never actually touch and the “disgusting”
object is completely sealed in packaging. Id. at 281. Our feelings of disgust easily transfer not
just between objects, but to people coming into contact with those objects. See KELLY, supra
note 81, at 19.
206. Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 384.
207. See JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA, at xvii-iii (3d ed. 2012) (“Sex is easily attached to other social
concerns, especially those related to impurity and disorder, and it often evokes highly
irrational responses.”); Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 384.
208. See John A. Terrizzi, Jr. et al., Disgust: A Predictor of Social Conservatism and
Prejudicial Attitudes Toward Homosexuals, 49 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 587,
591 (2010).
209. Catherine Cocks, Rethinking Sexuality in the Progressive Era, 5 J. GILDED AGE &
PROGRESSIVE ERA 93, 93 (2006).
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sexual activity less effective.210 Meanwhile, technological advances
in advertising, manufacturing, and transportation presented new
opportunities for sexual expression and activity outside of the
home.211 The result was a deep anxiety over the changing nature of
sexuality, and a desire to develop new regulatory mechanisms to
prevent such change.212 In the Victorian era, the dominant view of
the female role emphasized the inherent moral purity of women who
were described as naturally modest and passive.213 More frequent
portrayals of female sexuality in the public sphere as well as an
increased willingness to equate sex with pleasure among the
working classes threatened to upend the Victorian view.214
These concerns translated into legal action in several ways.215 A
legally and politically sophisticated social purity movement pushed
for reform of what it deemed a sexually toxic environment.216 The
movement rooted out red light districts that had been willfully
ignored by authorities in the past.217 It called for advertisements to
no longer make overt appeals based on female sexuality, instead
asking advertisers to focus on women’s strength and moral charac-
210. Id. at 116; Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the
Nineteenth-Century United States, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369, 370-72 (2002); Melissa
Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2012).
211. D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 207, at 166, 173 (describing how the “market
economy drew sexuality out of the home, including ... advertisements for conception and
abortion” and migration of working class women to work in urban manufacturing zones away
from their families); Murray, supra note 210, at 12 (“The changes wrought by
industrialization expanded the opportunities for out-of-wedlock sexuality.”).
212. See Estelle B. Freedman, Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century America: Behavior, Ideology,
and Politics, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 196, 203 (1982); Murray, supra note 210, at 27-29.
213. Brian Donovan, Gender Inequality and Criminal Seduction: Prosecuting Sexual
Coercion in the Early 20th Century, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 61, 65 (2005).
214. See id. at 68-69, 83.
215. The medical profession reacted as well. Psychiatrists identified new disorders meant
to link more modern sexual attitudes and behaviors with mental dysfunction. The
“hypersexual female, the willfully passionate” woman, incapable of controlling her desire,
required institutionalization and medical treatment. Elizabeth Lunbeck, “A New Generation
of Women”: Progressive Psychiatrists and the Hypersexual Female, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 513, 513
(1987).
216. Dennis, supra note 210, at 377; see also J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, You Can Steal Her
Virginity but Not Her Doll: The Nineteenth Century Campaign to Raise the Legal Age of Sexual
Consent, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 229, 230-31 (2009) (describing the purity movement as
being based on sexual restraint and stigmatizing all non-marital sexuality).
217. John C. Burnham, The Progressive Era Revolution in American Attitudes Toward Sex,
59 J. AM. HIST. 885, 901, 907-08 (1973).
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ter.218 Reformers pushed through laws in a majority of states to
raise the age of sexual consent.219 Obscenity law was invoked to
attack a broad array of communications thought to degrade women,
including birth control information.220 Judges were receptive to such
arguments, ignoring the free speech implications of using obscenity
law to eliminate alternative visions of American womanhood.221
Two particular legal innovations of the time deserve mention.
Concern over visible prostitution in the cities and male entreaties
that could lead women to out-of-wedlock sex led to the
criminalization of “seduction.”222 Women who agreed to sexual
activity due to a false promise of marriage could find redress in
court. Judges would pose a Hobson’s choice to male defendants
found to have made such a promise: either marry the plaintiff or
serve time in prison.223 The result was judicial affirmation that
marriage was the only appropriate site of sexual activity and a
disciplining of those, both female and male, that attempted to
engage in such activity outside of the marital bed.224
Meanwhile, defamation law was invoked to affirm the rigid sex
roles of the Victorian era. According to judges, statements that
implied a lack of female chastity had ruinous consequences and
could not be tolerated.225 Affirming the view of women as naturally
sexually pure while acknowledging the treacherous sexual environ-
ment women now had to navigate, the Kansas Supreme Court
explained: “The world is censorious, and a woman’s or a maiden’s
reputation for modesty and chastity is an asset of inestimable value.
Its loss renders her poor indeed.”226 Dramatically restructuring
218. Dennis, supra note 210, at 378.
219. Ehrlich, supra note 216, at 235.
220. Dennis, supra note 210, at 385. To the extent birth control advertising continued in
this period, it had to alter its message to fit the conservative view of sexuality, touting
“reliability for married women” rather than a generalized promise of sex without conception.
ANDREA TONE, DEVICES AND DESIRES: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTIVES IN AMERICA 31 (2001).
221. Dennis, supra note 210, at 380. Judges did not begin applying a First Amendment
analysis to obscenity decisions until almost the mid-twentieth century. Id.
222. Murray, supra note 210, at 17.
223. Id. at 23.
224. Id. at 24.
225. See, e.g., Hardin v. Harshfield, 12 S.W. 779, 779 (Ky. 1890) (calling for the law of
slander to be used to protect “defenseless and helpless women against false and malicious
imputations, that tend to humiliate and degrade them in society”).
226. Cooper v. Seaverns, 105 P. 509, 515 (Kan. 1909).
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defamation law to fit this view of female sexuality, courts made
statements impugning a woman’s chastity per se slanderous.227
Motivated by a desire to protect women and the family unit from the
social and economic changes of the time,228 this change to defama-
tion law had significant cultural consequences. It reinforced the idea
that without a reputation for sexual purity, a woman was nothing.229
It also provided a legal tool for changing the discourse, driving open
talk of overt female sexuality underground.230
In this environment, some early trademark law and related
business torts decisions appear to be grounded on a particular view
of sexual morality, rather than a desire to avoid consumer confusion
or protect producer goodwill.231 A military school successfully alleged
“trade libel” when a group of clergymen falsely accused it of
permitting intersex dancing on its grounds.232 The Missouri
Supreme Court maintained that the clergymen’s accusations were
“susceptible of no other fair construction than as containing an
imputation upon plaintiff’s morality.”233 Overt racism mixed with
sexual moral concerns when another court explained that although
it was not libelous to falsely contend that a corporation was
unsanitary and paid its workers less than its rivals, it was per se
libelous to charge that the corporation permitted a male African
American to supervise white female workers.234 The court explained
that it was “the general feeling everywhere prevailing that the
negro ... is not and cannot be a fit associate for white girls.”235 
A decision on unfair competition based on trade dress offers
another window into the sexual anxieties of the early twentieth-
227. E.g., Gates v. N.Y. Recorder Co., 49 N.E. 769, 770 (N.Y. 1898); see Lisa R. Pruitt, Her
Own Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63 MD. L. REV. 401, 406 (2004).
228. See Andrew J. King, Constructing Gender: Sexual Slander in Nineteenth-Century
America, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 63, 65-66 (1995).
229. See Lisa R. Pruitt, “On the Chastity of Women All Property in the World Depends”:
Injury from Sexual Slander in the Nineteenth Century, 78 IND. L.J. 965, 1016 (2003).
230. See id. at 1016-17.
231. See William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980, 5
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 268 (1993) (“[C]ases from the 1920s and 1930s establish beyond
doubt that the era was one of continuing, and perhaps even expanded, judicial enforcement
of Victorian sexual norms.”).
232. St. James Military Acad. v. Gaiser, 28 S.W. 851 (Mo. 1894).
233. Id. at 853.
234. Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183 S.W. 269, 275-77 (Ky. 1916).
235. Id. at 277.
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century legal elite. A publisher sued its rival for unfair competition,
contending that the rival had simulated its magazine in a manner
likely to confuse purchasers.236 Although the judge hearing the case
acknowledged many confusing similarities—both publications used
the word “stocking” in their titles, used the same size paper, had
similar front covers and pictures, contained similarly themed stories
and jokes, and even carried an identical advertisement237—he stated
that “salacious stories and daring photographs ... designed to stir up
jaded sex appetites ... warrant no aid from a court of equity.”238 The
magazines not only concerned sex, he noted, but also suggested
“sexual affairs between unmarried ... persons.”239 Most disturbing,
in the court’s view, was the potential effect of such publications on
young women. The judge explained that “[a] prudent caution ...
compelled me to place the exhibits under lock and key in order to
prevent them from falling into the hands of my young daughter.”240
Despite compelling evidence of potential consumer confusion, the
judge refused to hold for the plaintiff because of his desire to stifle
the growth of such publications: “Only by such positive measures
can we protect the minds of our growing boys and girls from this
pestilence and noisome filth.”241 
B. Sexuality and Modern Trademark Law
Although trademark decisions no longer engage in the open
criticism of particular sexual expressions and practices described
above, trademark law still reflects moral opprobrium for sexualized
depictions deemed outside of certain heterosexual norms. The most
obvious modern example of judges using their moral circuitry to
decide trademark disputes comes in the context of claims of mark
dilution from a defendant’s sexually related uses. Dilution refers to
uses of a mark that, even if not confusing, would gradually whittle
236. Ultem Publ’ns v. Arrow Publ’ns Inc., 2 N.Y.S.2d 933, 933-34 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
237. Id. at 935, 938.
238. Id. at 937-38.
239. Id. at 934.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 937; see also Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors,
Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 205-07 (2008)
(discussing late 1800s cases denying copyright protection to sexually explicit stage shows on
grounds that they lacked “substantive merit”).
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away or disperse the established public meaning of the mark.242
Dilution comes in two varieties, blurring and tarnishment.243
According to federal statute, both blurring and tarnishment occur
when an association arises from the similarity between a mark and
a famous mark.244 If the association “impairs the distinctiveness of
the famous mark,” there is blurring;245 if the association “harms the
reputation of the famous mark,” there is tarnishment.246 
In investigating whether such a harm to reputation has occurred,
courts take particular care to police unauthorized use of marks in
sexual contexts. In fact, there is now a judge-made presumption of
trademark dilution when a defendant uses a mark to sell sex-related
products. In V Secret Catalogue v. Moseley, the Sixth Circuit
articulated the view that tarnishment of a trademark through use
in a sexual context was automatic. In the words of the court, “any
new mark with a lewd or offensive-to-some sexual association raises
a strong inference of tarnishment.”247 
The Moseley decision stands out for a few reasons. First, no
presumption of tarnishment exists for any other type of use of a
trademark. For other nonsexual uses, further proof of reputational
harm, perhaps in the form of a consumer survey, is required.248 For
some reason, sexual uses of a famous mark cause courts to presume
tarnishment when alternative uses can be just as destabilizing to an
original brand’s meaning. Moseley is the first case to make this
242. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813,
825 (1927).
243. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
244. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)-(C).
245. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
246. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
247. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010).
248. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 110 (2d Cir.
2009) (faulting plaintiff for not providing survey evidence demonstrating that coffee
purveyor’s use of term “Charbucks Blend” harmed its reputation); N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v.
N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 479, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to presume that an
association between the New York Stock Exchange and casino gambling would harm the
Exchange’s reputation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002); Kellogg Co.
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 809-10 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (noting that courts
“usually find tarnishment only in cases where a distinctive mark is depicted in an obviously
degrading context, often involving a sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal activity” and
concluding that the defendant’s reputation for environmental pollution could not be a sound
basis for a finding of tarnishment).
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presumption explicit. Even before Moseley, however, other courts
seemed to implicitly adopt this sexual double standard.
For example, in separate actions, famous toy retailer Toys “R” Us
sued online sellers of lingerie and firearms for tarnishing its
brand.249 The lingerie seller identified itself as “Adults R Us”;250
the firearms seller as “Guns Are Us.”251 One court granted a
preliminary injunction against the lingerie seller,252 but the other
awarded summary judgment to the gun retailer.253 The second
result is particularly puzzling. Toys “R” Us, in an effort to burnish
its family-friendly image, was one of the first stores to refuse to
carry toy guns, and it widely publicized this fact.254 Given that the
Toys “R” Us brand partially defined itself as antigun, it seems
plausible to argue that reminding consumers of its brand while they
purchase firearms would be detrimental to its brand reputation.
Although one court was quick to find tarnishment from sexual use,
the gun retailer escaped liability.255
In some ways, presuming dilution from sexual use of a trademark
makes sense. If our moral sense is triggered more easily by sexual
concepts, then consumers are less likely to engage in rational
deliberation when evaluating a defendant’s sexualized use of the
plaintiff’s mark. Such use could result in liability because “[t]arnish-
ment covers cases where the defendant uses a similar mark in a
way that severely clashes with the meanings that consumers
associate with the plaintiff’s mark.”256 Maybe, given our hardwiring
when it comes to rendering judgments that touch upon sexual
activity, consumers are more likely to perceive a severe clash
249. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated on pro-
cedural grounds, 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999); Toys “R” Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
250. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
251. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
252. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
253. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
254. Id. at 641.
255. See also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (listing a striptease
club calling itself “the Tiffany Club” as an example of dilution by tarnishment); DC Comics
Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 112-15 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (finding dilution
of “Superman” and “Wonder Woman” marks by singing telegram company that used marks
“Super Stud” and “Wonder Wench”).
256. Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 473 (2008). 
136 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:085
between the meaning of a plaintiff’s mark and a sexually suggestive
use of that mark by the defendant.257 
Courts go beyond this proposition, however, and concede tarnish-
ment on the basis of a sexually related use even when the plaintiff’s
mark already possesses a sexual connotation. The second thing to
note about the Moseley decision is that Victoria’s Secret, the
plaintiff, already held a mark whose meaning was drenched in sex.
It is one thing to argue that a defendant’s sexualized use harms a
brand with a nonsexual or child-friendly reputation. But it is quite
another to argue a per se harm from any sexual use of a famous
mark, even when that mark is already highly sexualized. The kind
of harm cognized by a tarnishment claim is the clash between the
meaning already held by the plaintiff’s mark and the use employed
by the defendant. When the plaintiff’s mark is already suffused with
sexual meaning, it is hard to see how a defendant’s use in a sexual
manner should be presumed to be tarnishing.
The Moseley decision resulted in a permanent injunction barring
the defendant, a small retailer in the town of Elizabethtown,
Kentucky, from naming its store “Victor’s Secret.”258 In justifying its
decision, the majority cited eight other federal cases finding
tarnishment when the defendant’s mark was used to sell sex-related
products.259 For some of these cases, it was readily apparent that
use in a sexual context could detrimentally conflict with the popular
meaning of the famous brand. Kraft, owner of the VELVEETA
trademark, successfully argued tarnishment by the defendant’s use
of the name “VelVeeda” for a pornographic website.260 Similarly, the
owners of the POTTERY BARN mark, who, among other things, sell
furnishings for children, were able to stop use of their mark on
sexually oriented websites.261 On the other hand, for some of the
257. It is by no means established, however, that sexual uses of a famous mark are more
likely to be dilutive. It may be that our intuitive sensitivity to sexual matters makes us more
capable of conceptually separating a sexualized use of a famous mark from a nonsexualized
use. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science,
86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 536-42 (2008) (offering reasons why dilutive uses may actually reinforce,
rather than weaken, the strength of a famous mark).
258. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2010).
259. Id. at 388.
260. Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949-50 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
261. Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Friendfinder, Inc., No. C 06-6572 JSW (MEJ), 2007 WL
4973848, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007).
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cited cases, the plaintiff alleging tarnishment through sexually
related uses already held a mark with a sexual flavor. For example,
it is not readily apparent to this author that a trade show exhibition
featuring two models distributing condoms while perched on a
VIAGRA-branded missile naturally defiles the Viagra brand.262
Nevertheless, the judge in that matter held that such sexually
themed activities automatically tarnished the Viagra name.263
One might argue that the dilution by tarnishment cause of action
is a trademark law outlier in that it seems to openly invite moral
judgment. Unlike the infringement cause of action, which necessi-
tates an empirical examination of consumer confusion, dilution by
tarnishment calls for an open-ended judicial inquiry into a mark’s
“reputation.” In assessing whether that reputation has been harmed
by the defendant’s actions, judges may be naturally drawn to moral
concerns.264 Yet it is important to recognize that regardless of the
moral intuition behind these decisions, to the extent they offer any
justification beyond the mere language of the statute, judges choose
to publicly justify themselves through the same search costs
arguments employed for the rest of trademark law.
Dilution law began out of an attempt to preserve mark meaning
so that established marks could continue to be relied on by consum-
ers. The dilution concept was initiated by Professor Frank
Schechter, who urged antidilution legislation to protect the valuable
“uniqueness” of distinct marks.265 Rather than appealing to moral
sentiment, Schechter justified his proposal by the “rational” need to
protect these unique marks so they could continue to send the same
262. See Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
263. Id.; Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339,
1354-55 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (presuming tarnishment of Victoria’s Secret brand from mere
registration of domain names that were to be used as adult entertainment websites); see also
Victoria’s Secret Stores v. Artco Equip. Co., 194 F. Supp. 2d 704, 712, 729-32 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(finding dilution by tarnishment from defendant’s sale of lingerie and sex toys under domain
name “victoriassecrets.net”).
264. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410,
422 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing tarnishment as when a famous mark “ceases to serve as a
wholesome identifier of the owner’s products” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994))). One scholar
sees a parallel in protection of famous marks through the dilution by tarnishment doctrine
and moral rights protections for copyrighted works. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright
Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1140 (2010).
265. Schechter, supra note 242, at 825.
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informational signals to consumers.266 As Rebecca Tushnet has
argued, Schechter’s contentions “have simply been formalized and
translated into the language of law and economics” by modern
courts and legal scholars.267 Judge Posner describes tarnishment as
a subset of blurring because “it reduces the distinctness of the
trademark as a signifier of the trademarked product or service.”268
In other words, even if not confused by the defendant’s tarnishing
use of the famous mark to the point of making a mistaken purchase,
consumers are no longer able to retrieve a famous mark from
memory as quickly when they are also confronted with a tarnishing
use. These “internal search costs” are the reason for prohibiting
diluting mark uses.269 Others have endorsed Posner’s reasoning,270
even though consumer studies cast doubt on whether dilutive, non-
confusing uses of a mark actually delay the retrieval of a famous
brand from memory.271
The important point for my analysis is that rather than admitting
that they are engaging in moral judgment, some courts attempt to
frame their tarnishment decisions in the predominant economic
language of trademark law. For example, the Moseley court
contended that its presumption of tarnishment was based on “an
economic prediction about consumer taste.”272 Yet neither the
Moseley court nor any of the decisions cited in the Moseley opinion
provide evidence that an association with something sexual
automatically harms the reputation of a product or service already
associated with sex. Instead of being an example of systematic
266. See id. Note, however, that Schechter never specifically mentioned a cause of action
for “tarnishment.” See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123
HARV. L. REV. 809, 857 (2010).
267. Tushnet, supra note 257, at 525.
268. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
269. Id. at 510-12.
270. E.g., MetroPCS Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Mobile USA, L.P., No. 3:08-CV-1658-D, 2009
WL 3075205, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2009). For examples of scholarship justifying tarnish-
ment protection in terms of consumer search costs, see Bone, supra note 2, at 605; Jacob
Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary Meaning, Genericism,
Fame, Confusion, and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1047-48 (2001); see also Tushnet,
supra note 257, at 520 n.54 (collecting examples of legal scholars agreeing with Posner’s
search costs argument for general antidilution protection).
271. See Tushnet, supra note 257, at 527-44.
272. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010).
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reasoning, dilution decisions reveal an instinctual desire to punish
sexualized uses of another’s trademark. 
Even for cases not involving a dilution by tarnishment claim,
judges react swiftly to sanction defendants for sexualized mark
uses. Although officially deciding the case under a likelihood of
confusion claim, the Second Circuit used the reasoning of dilution
by tarnishment to enjoin use of the trademarked uniforms of the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders in a pornographic film. The court
made plain just how convinced it was that the use of these uniforms
would have a tarnishing effect: “[I]t is hard to believe that anyone
who had seen defendants’ sexually depraved film could ever
thereafter disassociate it from plaintiff’s cheerleaders.”273 It is
unclear why the Second Circuit assumed this negative reaction
towards the cheerleaders’ brand from the film’s viewers given that
brand’s meaning. Whatever the values are that consumers associate
with the Cowboys Cheerleaders, chastity is not among them.274
Moreover, in evaluating whether a defendant has infringed an-
other’s mark, a court is meant to assess whether consumers are
likely to falsely infer a relationship between the defendant and the
plaintiff. The language from the Second Circuit suggests an
instinctive moral judgment of the defendant rather than a delibera-
tive inquiry into consumers’ likelihood to mistake one use of the
cheerleader uniform for another.
Visceral reaction to sexual expression deemed transgressive can
guide a trademark decision even when evidence of the expression’s
effects on consumers is thin at best. Consider a case involving a
gay rights group’s use of the name “The Pink Panther Patrol.”275
The court declined to consider a state dilution claim, instead finding
for the trademark holder, MGM, on the basis of likelihood of
273. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202, 205
(2d Cir. 1979). 
274. See Pamela J. Bettis & Natalie Guice Adams, Short Skirts and Breast Juts: Cheer-
leading, Eroticism and Schools, 6 SEX EDUC. 121, 123 (2006) (“The Dallas Cowboys’
Cheerleaders, with their patented hot pants and low-cut cowgirl vests and shirts, was the first
such squad to make explicit the sexual element of cheerleading.”); Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex
Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 131 (2012) (“[D]uring
that era, if someone was going to have a sexual fantasy about cheerleaders, it likely would
have centered around the Dallas Cowboys’ cheerleaders.”).
275. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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confusion.276 Yet the district judge’s opinion, like the decision in the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case, sounds in the language of
dilution by tarnishment. He noted that whereas MGM’s “Pink
Panther” cartoon character has a “lighthearted, nonpolitical,
asexual” image, the gay rights group associated the Pink Panther
name “with political activism, violence, defiance, [and] homosexual-
ity.”277 In other words, it was important that the famous mark was
“asexual” whereas the defendant’s use was “homosexual” and,
therefore, threatened a “cheapening” of the famous mark.278 As
others have noted in discussing this case, it is by no means apparent
that the gay rights group’s use of “Pink Panther Patrol” would con-
fuse consumers given the different consuming bases and marketing
channels for the two marks—not to mention the sheer implausibility
of MGM getting into the street patrol business in New York City.279
Nevertheless, the court deemed the defendant’s use a sexual one
and, therefore, presumed damage to the MGM mark.280
These cases reveal a seemingly automatic willingness to presume
harm from a defendant’s use of sexual imagery—or, in the MGM
case, from merely referencing sexual activity outside of dominant
norms. This presumption cannot be justified on efficiency grounds.
After all, even though other types of mark use may influence
consumers and potentially disturb the established meaning behind
a famous mark, courts are unwilling to presume harm from such
nonsexual uses. Instead, this modern doctrinal trend mirrors the
decisions of Progressive-era legal elites in cases involving sexual
expression. Similar to the current willingness to presume tarnish-
ment from sexual uses, early twentieth-century judges presumed
slander whenever someone referenced a woman’s sexual behavior.
At the same time, judges mobilized the laws of seduction, obscenity,
trade libel, and unfair competition to affirm a chaste vision of
276. Id. at 871, 877.
277. Id. at 876.
278. See id. at 877.
279. See Regina Schaffer-Goldman, Note, Cease-and-Desist: Tarnishment’s Blunt Sword
in Its Battle Against the Unseemly, the Unwholesome, and the Unsavory, 20 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1241, 1267 (2010). 
280. The court’s willingness to presume damage from the gay rights group’s “sexual” use
is all the more striking given that the judge in the case, Pierre Leval, is known as a
particularly thoughtful and influential intellectual property jurist. See Beebe, supra note 8,
at 1627.
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womanhood.281 Although modern courts justify their dilution
holdings through statutory language and reference to consumer
search costs,282 the parallel with the past suggests the influence of
a similar vision of acceptable, heteronormative sexuality.
IV. PROTECTING THE NATION-STATE
Another moral intuition evident in trademark jurisprudence
reflects a desire to protect and preserve certain ideas of the
American nation-state. Though untethered to the goal of consumer
protection, moral judgments rooted in nationalism shape trademark
doctrine in important ways. First, trademark law’s territoriality
principle refuses to countenance those situations in which foreign
uses must be acknowledged and legitimated with priority rights in
the United States lest shoppers be confused. Second, when commer-
cial actors appropriate symbols of American authority, consumer
protection takes a backseat to judicial visions of the national polity.
One can see the influence of two moral foundations, ingroup loyalty
and respect for authority, in these areas of trademark doctrine.
A. Territoriality and National Loyalty
As mentioned in Part I, psychologists have identified moral
intuitions relating to ingroup loyalty and respect for authority.
Actions interpreted as disloyal to one’s social group or disrespectful
to a symbol of authority may be judged immoral.283 As with the
Purity/Sanctity foundation, situations activating these moral
intuitions can produce strong emotional reactions. Psychologists
testing subjects for such reactions note feelings of disgust when
these intuitions are activated, just like those experienced when
confronted with sexual behavior deemed immoral.284 What is most
striking about these areas of moral judgment is their potential
281. See supra notes 215-41 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 265-74.
283. See Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 372, 383-84; Haidt & Kesebir, supra note 38,
at 822; Adrian M.S. Piper, Higher-Order Discrimination, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND
MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 35, at  285.
284. HAUSER, supra note 38, at 199; KELLY, supra note 81, at 145; Rozin et al., supra note
50, at 770.
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inconsistency with other areas of moral judgment, particularly
concerns over fairness and reciprocity. Humans continually dis-
criminate against others for reasons that appear to violate other
moral foundations. Some actions may be deemed moral, even if
causing harm or denying justice to others, if they reflect loyalty to
one’s own social cohort.285 On the other hand, performing an unpa-
triotic act might not actually harm an individual or trample on her
rights, yet many would view such an act as immoral.286 
Nationalist impulses are one effect of these innate preferences for
members of our own social group and familiar sources of authority.
Nationalism has been described as a response to modern con-
ditions.287 In the early twentieth century, some argued that forming
a national ingroup, based on political sovereignty, was necessary to
find the social cohesion needed to compete in a new economic
landscape.288 Yet there are reasons for feeling loyal to one’s national
ingroup apart from economic self-interest. Historians place respon-
sibility for the Spanish-American War, and other turn of the century
imperialist moves, not on national security interests but on
“subjective worries about self-definition and identity.”289 As U.S.
citizens in the industrial age became detached from close-knit
groupings based on kin and locality, they turned to other sources for
a common culture and shared sense of identity. After being
disempowered by modern industrial forces, elites sought to regain
their identity through talk of nationhood.290 The nationalist spirit
also found its way into the trademark doctrines created by early
twentieth-century judges.
Perhaps one example of the nationalist impulse surrounding
American trademark law is the territoriality principle. Under the
principle, only uses of a mark in the United States can ultimately
285. HAUSER, supra note 38, at 122-23. For a work demonstrating the unstated importance
of victim identity to criminal law, see Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1087 (2013).
286. See Haidt & Joseph, supra note 17, at 383; Piper, supra note 283, at 285.
287. Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan, Introduction to THE MORALITY OF NATIONALISM 1, 5
(Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan eds., 1997).
288. Id.; see also Bartholomew, supra note 18, at 16-17 (noting arguments of the time for
using advertising to homogenize the tastes of immigrants).
289. FRANK NINKOVITCH, THE UNITED STATES AND IMPERIALISM 16 (2001).
290. RICHARD H. IMMERMAN, EMPIRE FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN TO PAUL WOLFOWITZ 146 (2012).
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give rise to U.S. trademark rights.291 Achieving trademark recogni-
tion in a foreign nation does not necessarily translate into an award
of trademark rights in the United States, even if U.S. consumers are
familiar with the foreign mark.292 Hence, sales of a trademarked
product manufactured in the United States but sold exclusively to
customers in Canada do not constitute “use” that can trigger trade-
mark rights under U.S. law.293 
One can envision a contrary approach in which once a mark was
deemed legally protected in one country, whether it be Spain,
Surinam, or the United States, merchandise carrying that mark
would be deemed lawful and non-infringing no matter where
merchandise bearing that mark traveled. In fact, this view did hold
sway  among some trademark courts in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.294 For those courts, a “universality”
principle stipulated that a trademark must only truthfully identify
its original manufacturer to enjoy protection.295 Under this view,
goods lawfully made under a trademark valid in one country could
be imported to the United States without infringing the rights of a
domestic manufacturer employing the same mark.296 Such behavior
291. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2007). The relatively
recent adoption of an intent to use regime allows for U.S. trademark registrations to be issued
based on the registration of the same mark by an owner who intends to use the trademark in
commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006). However, the applicant must ultimately use the
mark in commerce in the United States or the registration will be deemed abandoned. Shelby
v. Ford Motor Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1472 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1993), dismissed, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692 (C.D. Cal 1997); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory:
Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 909 n.86 (2004).
292. See Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Fuji Photo
Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985); Osawa &
Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 68,
§ 29:1.
293. See Shelby, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472 n.2. Relatedly, to defeat a claim of trademark
abandonment, evidence of use in the United States, not foreign uses, is required. Imperial
Tobacco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
294. See, e.g., Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 21 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886); see also Lee Ann
W. Lockridge, Honoring International Obligations in U.S. Trademark Law: How the Lanham
Act Protects Well-Known Foreign Marks (and Why the Second Circuit Was Wrong), 84 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1347, 1392 (2010) (“Universality of rights, rather than strict territoriality of
rights, held sway within trademark law until the 1930s.”).
295. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 68, § 29:1; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (8th ed.
2004) (describing “national treatment” as “universality” or the “policy or practice of a country
that accords the citizens of other countries the same intellectual-property protection as it
gives its own citizens, with no formal treaty of reciprocity required”).
296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. f (1995).
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was not deemed confusing because the imports truly identified the
source of the goods.297 
Yet this approach was thoroughly rejected in favor of the rule that
trademark rights, within a particular sovereignty, arise only out of
their use in that particular sovereignty.298 In some circumstances,
this rule matches trademark’s professed goal of reducing consumer
search costs. Consider a scenario in which two businesses, one
foreign and one based in the United States, use the same mark. The
foreign business was the first to use the mark anywhere in the
world, except in the United States, whereas the U.S. business was
the first to use the mark in this country. Awarding U.S. trademark
rights to the foreign brand over the domestic brand could produce
confusion. If foreign uses resulted in priority rights for the foreign
user in this country, the foreign user would be able to claim
trademark protection even when its mark was unknown to U.S.
consumers. Even worse, U.S. consumers may have already devel-
oped an association between the mark and its U.S. producer. If a
court awards the foreign company priority rights in the United
States, consumers might obtain goods under the foreign company’s
mark while thinking that the goods were affiliated with the U.S.
producer. In such a scenario, applying the territoriality principle
and awarding rights only to the U.S.-based producer avoids
confusion and makes perfect sense under the search costs justifica-
tion for trademark law espoused by modern judges. 
But the territoriality principle is also applied in ways likely to
cause consumer confusion, demonstrating that there is more behind
the principle than a desire to preserve the ability of consumers to
make efficient choices. When U.S. consumers do have prior experi-
ence with a foreign brand, an award of trademark rights to a
domestic latecomer can produce confusion. It is entirely possible for
U.S. consumers to recognize a mark used exclusively in a foreign
jurisdiction.299 U.S. citizens may travel to the jurisdiction and
297. See Margo A. Bagley, Using Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to Block Materially
Different Gray Market Goods in the Common Control Context: Are Reports of Its Death Greatly
Exaggerated?, 44 EMORY L.J. 1541, 1546 (1995).
298. E.g., Topps Co. v. Cadbury Stani S.A.I.C., 526 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 2008). 
299. See Sarah B. Chopnick, Comment, Search Costs and Famous Foreign Marks: Should
Congress Reduce the Search Costs of the Global Consumer and Protect Famous Foreign
Marks?, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 213, 235-36 (2008).
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become aware of the goods or services offered under the mark. Or
consumers may be exposed to advertising for a marked product
available just across the United States border in Canada or
Mexico.300 Recent immigrants can bring their familiarity with
brand names purchased in their home country to the United States.
Under each of these circumstances, U.S. residents may believe that
products offered under the same mark in the United States are
coming from the foreign interest rather than an unaffiliated
domestic producer. In all of these scenarios, however, under the
territoriality principle, the domestic producer wins trademark
protection, not the foreign interest. Without some softening of the
territoriality principle, some consumers will mistakenly purchase
trademarked goods produced by an unknown American manufac-
turer while thinking that they are coming from a famous foreign
business.
Nevertheless, the majority of federal courts have refused to adjust
the territoriality principle to better reflect consumer interests. The
predominant rule under U.S. law remains that, regardless of
consumer familiarity with a foreign mark, only uses of the mark in
the United States can confer priority on a mark owner.301 Of the
federal courts of appeals, only the Ninth Circuit recognizes a
famous-mark exception to the territoriality principle, justifying the
exception on grounds of economic efficiency.302 As one Ninth Circuit
court explained, “[a]n absolute territoriality rule without a famous-
mark exception would promote consumer confusion and fraud.”303
Despite this strong language, all other federal courts, including the
Second Circuit, remain unmoved.304 One case describes the ter-
ritoriality principle as “a bedrock principle of federal trademark
law” that does not allow for exceptions.305 Legal arguments about
300. See Shelby v. Ford Motor Co., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1472 n.2 (C.D. Cal 1993),
dismissed, 43 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1692 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
301. See supra note 291.
302. Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don’t I Know You From Somewhere?: Protection in the United
States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known But Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP.
1379, 1382-83 (2008).
303. Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004). 
304. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007); Maruti.com v.
Maruti Udyog Ltd., 447 F. Supp. 2d 494, 500 (D. Md. 2006).
305. Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326-27
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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the familiarity of U.S. consumers with a foreign mark before its
actual use in this country typically fall on deaf ears.306 
The refusal of the federal courts to embrace the famous-mark
exception is even more striking given its repeated adoption by legal
authorities in other countries, often to the benefit of U.S. corpora-
tions. For example, when someone registered STARBUCKS in
Russia before the U.S. coffee purveyor had begun to sell its wares in
that country, Russian authorities agreed to cancel the registra-
tion.307 The same thing happened when an Iranian tried to register
MICKEY MOUSE in Iran.308 A South African court recognized
McDonald’s Corporation’s priority in such marks as BIG MAC,
MCMUFFIN, and the golden arches logo even though McDonald’s
had not been using the marks in South Africa—thanks to an
international embargo.309 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention of the
Protection of Industrial Property, of which the United States is a
signatory, mandates protection of “well-known” trademarks even if
those marks have not been “use[d] in commerce” in the country in
question.310
Why do American courts remain wedded to a rule that can reduce,
rather than enhance, consumer welfare? There is no doubt that
refusal to legally recognize the semiotic significance of famous
306. E.g., Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Impressa’s
registration and use of the Fashion Cafe name in Italy has not, given the territorial nature
of trademark rights, secured it any rights in the name under the Lanham Act.”); La Societe
Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974)
(“It is well settled that foreign use is ineffectual to create trademark rights in the United
States.”); Fiat Group Autos. S.P.A. v. ISM Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1113 (T.T.A.B.
2010); Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1589-91
(T.T.A.B. 2009) (refusing to recognize an exception to the territoriality principle for “well-
known” foreign marks).
307. See Andrew E. Kramer, After Long Dispute, a Russian Starbucks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/business/worldbusiness/
07sbux.html.
308. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 68, § 22:61.
309. McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd. 1996 (1) SA 1 (A) at
3-4 (S. Afr.); Jennifer Frankel, The Legal and Regulating Climate for Investment in Post-
Apartheid South Africa: An Historical Overview, 6, CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 190
(1998).
310. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, Mar. 20, 1883,
last revised July 14, 1979, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. U.S. courts have held that,
although the United States is a signatory, they are not bound in matters of trademark law by
the Convention. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2007); L’Aiglon
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 654 (3d Cir. 1954).
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foreign marks increases search costs for consumers.311 Some suggest
that historical inertia may be responsible.312 The territoriality
principle first arose in an earlier time when global trade was
minimal and many businesses claimed only limited geographical
rights within the United States. It may simply have been beyond
the imagination of early twentieth-century judges to create an
exception for internationally well-known marks in simpler economic
times. Even when the economy and the experiences of consumers
changed, these early precedents may have proved too difficult to
dislodge. But there may be something else besides traditionalism
motivating such unstinting devotion to the territoriality principle.
The territoriality principle invokes American nationalist sympa-
thies. It acts to privilege domestic companies, giving them, rather
than foreign competitors, control over the meaning of particular
commercial signifiers. Interpreting the law to help domestic
businesses may be desirable from an instrumental view, even if it
reduces consumer efficiency, but it may also reflect the influence of
a particular moral trigger. Strict adherence to the territoriality
principle, rather than reducing search costs, favors a national
ingroup against foreign outgroups. Hence, the principle may be
rooted in the Ingroup/Loyalty moral intuition, rather than concern
for consumer welfare.313
B. Respect for Symbols of National Authority
Courts also subvert efficiency goals when the trademark in
question invokes a national symbol. In early twentieth-century
cases, judges restricted commercial speech involving such symbols
by denying trademark protection to uses they deemed undignified.
311. Chopnick, supra note 299, at 236-37.
312. Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property
and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 79-82 (2013) (arguing that trademark law’s
statutory provisions limit its ability to recognize expression-based defenses); Dinwoodie, supra
note 291, at 891; cf. Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse than We Think: Trademark Defenses
in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 900-02 (2009) (maintaining that trademark
law’s structure has prevented it from adopting defenses to infringement responsive to
changing conditions).
313. See also Steven Wilf, Copyright and Social Movements in Late Nineteenth-Century
America, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 123, 143-44 (2011) (locating a move to stronger
copyright protection in the late 1800s to “a distinctly American xenophobic set of claims”
promoting a particular Anglo-American literary culture).
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Legislators crafted statutory language to aid them in this process.
Today, the same policing of commercial speech for threats to
national authority continues. Judges interpret statutes, both old
and new, to promote patriotism and punish disloyalty. 
One early example of a proposed mark considered disrespectful
to national authority comes from a 1909 decision of the Patent and
Trademark Office. The PTO refused to register former President
Grover Cleveland’s signature and picture as a trademark for
cigars.314 President Cleveland had authorized the use, but the PTO
explained: 
To use the names of ex-Presidents of the United States as
trademarks tends to detract from the dignity of the high office
which they have held, and for that reason it is believed that it is
against public policy for the Patent Office to encourage such use
of their names by allowing them to be registered as trade-
marks.315
 
In a subsequent decision, the PTO justified its earlier decision to
deny the Cleveland mark by stating it was “offensive to good
taste.”316
Similarly, in the hearings held on the bill that would become the
Lanham Act, representatives expressed concern that merely
prohibiting confusing uses of marks did not go far enough:
MR. ROBERTSON. Yes. Why should the Congress of the United
States, for example, permit Benjamin Harrison’s name, and I am
picking out an ex-President so far back so that his widow is
dead, why should the Congress of the United States permit
Benjamin Harrison’s name to be used as a trade-mark on any
article, device, or merchandise, even though dead?
MR. MARONEY. In other words, we would not want to have
Abraham Lincoln gin.
MR. ROBERTSON. No, sir; we would not.317
314. Ex parte Banner Cigar Mfg. Co., 1908 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 9, 10.
315. Id. at 10.
316. Ex parte Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., 1917 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 71, 72.
317. Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the H. Comm. on
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Representatives suggested adding to the new trademark statute a
prohibition on the registration of “disparaging marks.” Representa-
tive Robertson went on to say, however, that limiting the reach of
the Lanham Act to confusing and disparaging marks was insuffi-
cient in that one could use an ex-President’s name in a nonconfus-
ing, “respectful manner,” yet that kind of use should still be
disallowed.318 The result was a new trademark statute that provided
judges with a means to disallow not only confusing and disparaging
mark uses, but those uses they believed could bring “national
symbols ... into contempt, or disrepute.”319
In another early example, an adjudicator used this statutory
language to preserve the meaning of a symbol of the American
military. A company sought to register the word “Dough-boy” for a
prophylactic.320 The applicant had successfully registered the same
Patents, 76th Cong. 18 (1939), reprinted in Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food
Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
318. Id. at 1381.
319. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). In addition to the prohibitions on scandalous
and disparaging marks and marks that falsely suggest a connection with national symbols,
Section 2 of the Lanham Act contains additional provisions designed to preserve a particular
view of national identity. One provision in Section 2(a) prevents businesses from using marks
that suggest a connection with the federal government. Id. Suggesting a connection appears
to be an easier standard to meet than demonstrating a likelihood of confusion. Proposed
marks struck down for this reason include a toy mailbox bearing the insignia of the U.S.
Postal Service, In re Brumberger Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 475, 476-77 (T.T.A.B. 1978), a seal
with the words “U.S. Customs Service,” In re Peter S. Herrick P.A., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1505, 1506, 1511 (T.T.A.B. 2009), and the word mark NATIONAL COLLECTION & CREDIT
CONTROL combined with a picture of the American Eagle superimposed on a map of the
United States, In re Nat’l Collection & Credit Control, Inc., 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200 (T.T.A.B.
1966). In addition to the language of Section 2(a), Section 2(b) also prevents certain
commercial uses of national symbols. Section 2(b) imposes an absolute bar on any mark
“comprising the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States,” although the mark
must be an exact simulation of the original. § 1052(b). A separate statutory provision, which
seems to be largely ignored, prohibits any use of the United States flag “for advertising
purposes in any manner whatsoever.” 4 U.S.C. § 8(h)(i) (2006). As Professor McCarthy points
out in his treatise, almost half of the states have enacted similar provisions banning the use
of the U.S. flag in advertising. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 68, § 19:79. Many of these provisions
were enacted at the beginning of the twentieth century. Id. They were given further
legitimacy by a 1907 decision of the United States Supreme Court upholding the conviction,
under Nebraska law, of a defendant for selling beer with an image of the U.S. flag on the
bottles. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 38, 45-46 (1907). Section 2(c), which addresses marks
containing the names of living individuals, §1052(c), has been used to block “Eisenhower”
greeting cards and “Obama” pajamas. See In re Richard M. Hoefflin, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1174 (T.T.A.B. 2010); In re Masucci, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
320. Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227, 227 (P.T.O. 1951).
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mark for prophylactics over twenty-five years before but inadver-
tently allowed the registration to expire and had to reapply to the
Patent Office.321 A flour manufacturer that used the term
“Doughboy” for wheat flour opposed the condom maker’s attempt to
re-register.322 Although the examiner initially reviewing the
application concluded that the application posed no risk of confusion
to purchasers of wheat flour and allowed the registration, the
examiner-in-chief held the application unregisterable.323 The
examiner-in-chief found that the mark “obviously consists of or
comprises matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connec-
tion with [a national symbol] or bring [it] into contempt or disre-
pute.”324 He offered little argument in support of his finding, simply
explaining that the applicant’s use had this effect because the term
“doughboy” can refer to American soldiers that served in World War
I, and the applicant invoked this meaning by placing soldiers on its
packaging.325
Modern adjudications also use trademark law to prevent changes
to the preferred meaning of a national symbol. In San Francisco
Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee, the Supreme
Court decided that Congress meant to provide the U.S.O.C. the
ability to stop a gay rights organization from using the term
“Olympic” to promote its own athletic contest.326 The case involved
interpretation of the Amateur Sports Act, which contains a provi-
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
325. Id. In 1993, another condom manufacturer tried to register a mark consisting of a
drawing of a condom decorated with stars and stripes along with the word mark OLD GLORY
CONDOM CORP. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1217 (T.T.A.B.
1993). Although initially rejected by the PTO, on appeal the registration application was
approved. Id. at 1221. The condom manufacturer managed to convince the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board that, rather than showing contempt for a national symbol as in the
“Doughboy” case, its mark denoted respect for that symbol. See id. at 1217, 1221. The Board
highlighted a statement on the Old Glory packaging that condom usage prevented AIDS. The
packaging also included the sentence: “We believe it is patriotic to protect and save lives.” Id.
at 1217. Ultimately, the Board concluded that fusing the image of the flag with a condom, in
this particular instance, was not working harm on the flag. The packaging’s references to
patriotism and eliminating AIDS bespoke “a seriousness of purpose” that neutralized the
charge that the mark would disparage or bring a national symbol into contempt. Id. at 1221
& n.4.
326. 483 U.S. 522, 525, 527-28 (1987).
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sion prohibiting use of the word “Olympic” without the U.S.O.C.’s
consent.327 The Court credited the U.S.O.C.’s argument that
Congress meant to block unauthorized uses of the term “Olympic”
regardless of whether such uses would confuse consumers.328 The
Court also determined that the statute did not violate the First
Amendment as it represented a reasonable effort to achieve Con-
gress’s policy goals.329
Although there were several components to the Court’s decision,
including statutory construction and evaluation of a Fifth Amend-
ment claim,330 respect for a symbol of nationhood also played a role.
Rather than focusing on the statute’s effect on consumers, the Court
highlighted the U.S.O.C.’s role in articulating the symbolic values
of the United States. The majority justified its decision by explain-
ing that the U.S.O.C.’s monopoly on the word “Olympic” furthered
the organization’s stated objectives, including “establish[ing]
national goals for amateur athletic activities,” exercising exclusive
jurisdiction over U.S. participation in the Olympic Games, and
promoting U.S. involvement in athletic events with other nations.331
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, these objectives
demonstrate that the U.S.O.C.’s role is to serve as a national
symbol. “Although the Olympic ideals are avowedly nonpolitical,” he
explained, “Olympic participation is inescapably nationalist.”332
Brennan maintained that the national symbolism inherent in the
activities of the U.S.O.C. and the word “Olympic” meant that the
U.S.O.C. was a state actor and that the statute was an unconstitu-
tional prohibition of noncommercial speech.333 
The majority conveniently deemed the Act a regulation of
commercial speech and, therefore, less of a threat to free expres-
sion.334 But the majority’s real disagreement with the dissent was
not on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
expression. The majority simply placed more importance on using
the law to protect this particular version of national symbolism. It
327. Id. at 524; see also 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a)(4) (2006).
328. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 532-35.
329. Id. at 536-41.
330. Id. at 528-30, 542-47.
331. Id. at 534-39 n.17.
332. Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 548-56.
334. Id. at 524, 535-37, 540.
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explained that much of the value of the word “Olympic” came from
its limited use.335 In oral argument, one justice posited that it was
acceptable to prevent other businesses from using “Olympic” as a
point of comparison with the Olympic Games because of the dilutive
potential of such activities.336 For the majority, the importance of
preserving the meaning of a particular national symbol won out
over other concerns.337
San Francisco Arts & Athletics strongly influenced the Court as
it recently grappled with legal protection for another kind of
national symbol—military decorations.338 The Court had to decide
whether a federal statute making it a crime to falsely claim receipt
of such medals, including the Congressional Medal of Honor,
violated the First Amendment.339 Although a majority held the
statute invalid under the First Amendment,340 five of the nine
justices appeared convinced that false claims regarding the medals
worked a serious harm by diminishing their symbolic value.341 The
language of trademark dilution featured heavily in their arguments.
Multiple justices cited San Francisco Arts & Athletics as a valid
example of using the law to prevent a lessening of the distinctive
meaning of a cherished term.342 Justice Alito compared the effects
of knock-off goods on luxury brands to how “the proliferation of false
335. Id. at 539.
336. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Committtee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (No. 86-270), 1987 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 57, at *9.
337. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 534, 548. Fairness/Reciprocity concerns also
appeared to influence the Court as it noted the U.S.O.C.’s efforts to create its own meaning
for the word “Olympic.” In oral argument, Justice Scalia emphasized that the U.S.O.C. was
responsible for giving “Olympic” its current valence in national discourse and, accordingly,
was entitled to exercise plenary control to preserve that valence. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 336, at *11. Following this logic, the majority opinion explained that
because the U.S.O.C. had built up the word “Olympic” through its own efforts, a
Congressional award of complete rights over the word fell within traditional trademark law
protections and “constitutional bounds.” SFAA, 483 U.S. at 534-35. The Purity/Sanctity
trigger may have also had a role given the homophobia evident in another of the Court’s
decisions in the same timeframe. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
338. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
339. Id. at 2542.
340. Id. at 2551.
341. Id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring with Justice Kagan) (“To permit those who have not
earned those honors to claim otherwise dilutes the value of the awards.”); id. at 2559 (Alito,
J., dissenting with Justices Scalia and Thomas) (describing the “diluting effect” of false
claims).
342. Id. at 2554-56 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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claims about military awards blurs the signal given out by the
actual awards by making them seem more common than they really
are.”343 Justice Breyer described trademark laws as “the closest
analogy” to the statute at issue.344 It appears that Congress may
pass another law prohibiting speech regarding military decorations,
this time more narrowly defining the contexts in which it would
apply.345 If so, the Court signaled that it is likely that such a law
would pass its review.346 
Prohibitions on Abraham Lincoln gin, Doughboy condoms, and
unauthorized use of the word “Olympic” do nothing to help consum-
ers navigate the marketplace. In fact, truly offensive trademarks or
trademarks invoking national symbols can stand out of the informa-
tional clutter and serve as an efficient shorthand for consumers.347
Hence, one cannot justify these decisions under the economic
analysis typically touted as trademark law’s raison d’etre. Instead,
courts sometimes invoke trademark law to maintain the dignity of
particular symbols that, although not directly representing the
federal government, may be viewed as important markers of
American identity.348
V. FINDING A BETTER ROLE FOR MORAL ARGUMENTS IN  TRADE-
MARK LAW
So far my approach has been descriptive, merely cataloging and
characterizing some of the moral judgments that developed in early
343. Id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring).
345. Chris Carroll, Supreme Court Strikes Down Stolen Valor Act, STARS AND STRIPES
(Jun. 28, 2012), www.stripes.com/news/supreme-court-strikes-down-stolen-valor-act-1.181587
(discussing new legislation in Congress adding a “material gain” component to the criminal
prohibition on false claims of military decoration).
346. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547 (faulting the original statute for its “sweeping, quite
unprecedented reach” that “would apply with equal force to personal, whispered conversations
within a home”).
347. See, e.g., Davide Dukcevich, Hooters Is Grounded for Now, FORBES (Sept. 27,
2002, 1:50 PM), http://forbes.com/2002/09/27/0927hooters.html (describing the success of the
“Hooters” brand); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, In Remembrance of Our
Nation’s Heroes (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2001/01-51.jsp
(noting the effectiveness of the Army’s “Be All You Can Be” federally registered motto).
348. Of course, Congress may be engaging in its own moral decision making when it passes
statutes relevant to national symbols, which courts are subsequently required to apply and
interpret.
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twentieth-century trademark jurisprudence and remain largely in
place. In this final Part, I offer some thoughts on the problems with
using such judgments to render legal decisions as well as some
suggestions on how to make their inevitable use less problematic.
As I have indicated throughout this Article, the trademark
doctrines shaped by moral intuition—the focus on intent,349 the
personal names privilege,350 presumption of tarnishment from use
of a mark to sell sex-related goods,351 rigid application of the
territoriality principle352—produce inefficiencies for consumers.
Even though their proponents justify them in terms of the prevail-
ing search costs model, there is little doubt that these rules make
the commercial world harder, not easier, for consumers to navigate.
But the negative effects of these rules are not limited to increased
search costs. They are also problematic from other perspectives. 
One problem with judicial use of moral intuition is that it can
prevent the law from adapting to new technological or social
circumstances.353 By and large, our moral intuitions are conserva-
tive.354 The foundations at the heart of moral judgment have been
hardwired into our brains over centuries of evolutionary struggle.355
This encourages us to act on our moral impulses in ways that may
not be advantageous when modern realities are considered. We
recoil in disgust at certain behaviors thanks more to the survival
struggles of our progenitors than a real need to protect ourselves in
the more sanitary and regulated environment of the twenty-first
349. See supra Part II.B.
350. See supra Part II.C.
351. See supra Part III.B.
352. See supra Part IV.A.
353. Moral arguments are not the only conservative technique of legal argument, however.
Arguments in favor of doctrinal consistency can also retard legal change. Legal innovation and
adaptation are largely impossible if a judge feels completely duty-bound to follow every prior
holding. See Jeff A. King, Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 409, 414 (2008) (explaining that stare decisis, along with a belief in rational objectivity,
tends to create “conservative inertia in the law”). Similarly, historical arguments may neglect
new social forces that argue for a revised conception of the law’s practical effects. The same
may be true of rigid adherence to the specific text of statutory provisions.
354. I use “conservative” here to imply a generalized sense of caution and resistance to
change, not for its political meaning. Politically speaking, both liberals and conservatives
routinely engage in moral decision making. See generally HAIDT, supra note 77.
355. Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html.
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century.356 Morals can and do change, but this can be a slow
process.357 Even when our moral foundations narrow into a particu-
lar cultural focus, they may still be rooted in historical anachro-
nism.
For example, the refusal to recognize exceptions to the terri-
toriality principle reflects a time in the economic past when
consumer knowledge of particular goods and their manufacturers
depended on a physical presence within national borders. Revolu-
tions in transportation and communications technologies now allow
us to be familiar with brands produced and sold halfway around the
world. Political change has also rendered the territoriality principle
less coherent. In a globalized world, which increasingly relies on
both multi-national sources of authority and private ordering, the
principle appears increasingly outdated.358
Similarly, the personal names privilege reflects a perspective on
the marketplace that now seems antiquated. In the early twentieth
century, a trademark often reflected an individual’s personal
participation in the marketplace. The marks of the Wright
Company—named for aviation pioneers Orville and Wilbur
Wright—and the Ford Motor Company told stories of individual
initiative and perseverance as well as serving as signifiers of
product origin. In a postmodern world, however, we no longer
necessarily expect brands to identify the actual manufacturer of an
item. Instead, the brand supplies a marker of consistency and
quality, whereas the actual provider of the product remains
anonymous. Modern trademarks are artificial, corporate choices.
They do not organically arise from an individual’s efforts in the
marketplace. Rather, they are focus grouped and tested before they
ever hit store shelves. Consumers do not know and do not care that
HUGGIES diapers are made by the Kimberly-Clarke Corporation.
To be sure, trademarks still have semiotic significance for consum-
ers and some popular brand names are personal names. Generally
356. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 50, at D4.
357. See K C Calman, Evolutionary Ethics: Can Values Change, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 366,
366-68 (2004) (describing the changing moral conceptions of various medical topics from
“primitive societies to the present”).
358. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 68, § 29:1 (noting criticisms of the territoriality principle “in
a world market where information products like computer programs cannot be located at a
particular spot on the globe”).
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speaking, however, the branding culture has shifted, become more
artificial, and consumers no longer expect these marketplace
signposts to reflect a connection with a particular individual.359
There may be less sense in privileging the use of personal names in
this pseudonymous environment.360 
Another problem with moral intuition, particularly when invoked
by legal elites, is that it can operate as a proxy for locking in the
preferences of favored groups.361 Morality is a malleable concept and
is, therefore, susceptible to manipulation. For example, early
twentieth-century business law relied on ethical appeals to protect
vested interests. Thanks in part to moral concerns, the law of fraud,
privacy, and interference with contract were construed in a way to
cement the current distribution of wealth in favor of white, Anglo-
Saxon Protestants.362 
Similar charges might be levied against particular provisions of
modern trademark law.363 Many of the doctrines discussed in this
Article have been invoked to privilege elite commercial actors and
to discourage the expressive activities of non-elites. The presump-
tion of tarnishment for sex-related uses of a famous mark blocks
sexual expression involving trademarks that are avant-garde or
outside the mainstream. Cases finding tarnishment—even if
described in the language of consumer confusion—dispro-
portionately impact those outside of heterosexual and middle-class
norms. It is no accident that gay rights organizations, small-town
commercial actors, and low-budget filmmakers have been on the
wrong end of the tarnishment presumption. 
359.  Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 319, 359-60 (2008).
360. See Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and
Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379-80 (2005).
361. Although different, ethical arguments have been linked to the trend favoring
“originalism,” an interpretative theory that asks judges to look primarily to the original
understandings of a legal provision’s ratifying generation. See Jamal Greene, The Case for
Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1697-98 (2012).
362. See William E. Nelson, From Morality to Equality: Judicial Regulation of Business
Ethics in New York, 1920-1980, 43 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 223, 227-28 (1999).
363. See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and
the Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 187, 223 (2005) (critiquing use of trademark law to reject registration of “queer
marks”).
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Relatedly, by expansively defining probative intent, judges protect
established brands at the expense of young upstarts. By and large,
the judicial focus on intent helps only trademark plaintiffs. Al-
though a finding of bad intent dooms accused defendants, the
absence of wrongful intent does not typically exonerate them.364 As
a result, even if they lack evidence of the defendant’s intent before
filing suit, trademark holders are incentivized to file and commit the
defendant to expensive discovery proceedings in the hopes that such
evidence will appear.365 In many situations, defendants may capitu-
late rather than sink resources into an unpredictable process.366
Hence, moral intuition can translate into doctrine that is self-
serving for those already in power. 
Given the above, it would probably be better if moral decision
making had no influence on trademark law.367 Not only are the
doctrines spawned by moral concerns inefficient, but they appear ill-
tailored to modern marketplace realities and highly biased in favor
of commercial and cultural elites. Unfortunately, purging moral
considerations from judicial decisions is no more likely than
eliminating them from our own thought process. As described
earlier, much of the cognitive background for our moral judgments
is not accessible to us. Moral decision making can operate at an
instinctual, even subconscious level.368 Hence, urging judges to
simply ignore their inner moral voices is unlikely to succeed. 
This is not to say, however, that the quality of judicial decision
making involving moral intuition cannot be improved. Not all of our
moral reasoning goes on behind closed doors. As the analysis of
early twentieth-century case law throughout this Article demon-
strates, judges can and have marshaled explicit moral arguments in
favor of their decisions. When judges transparently announce the
influence of moral considerations in their decision making, they
364. See, e.g., GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2000);
Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Cntr., 109 F.3d 275, 287 (6th
Cir. 1997).
365. Casagrande, supra note 139, at 1470.
366. See id. at 1470-71; William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 49, 61-66 (2008).
367. Moral reasoning does not inevitably lead to bad results, however. As Dave Fagundes
pointed out to me, moral concerns likely had a role in the Supreme Court’s unanimous
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 437 U.S. 483 (1984), to good, history-changing effect.
368. See supra Part I.
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subject those considerations to potential criticism, whether from
appellate bodies, lawyers appearing before them, or the general
public. In this way, moral appeals can be tested and screened for
flaws in a collective fashion. Moreover, just being aware of the
potential influence of moral intuition can steer decision makers
toward a different way of thinking. Research demonstrates that
greater mindfulness can channel our decision-making process into
a more systematic mode and thereby limit the influence of hidden
biases.369 In other contexts, increased attention to potential
prejudices has brought latent moral reasoning to the surface and
improved decisional outcomes.370
So the goal should not be to completely excise moral concerns
from trademark law but to bring them to the surface and subject
them to further interrogation, just like any other technique of legal
argument. To some degree, this has already been done in the field
of constitutional law. Constitutional law scholar Philip Bobbitt has
made the case for increased use of moral arguments in constitu-
tional decision making, but only when fashioned with two particular
limits in mind. Encouraging the use of moral arguments with
similar limitations also makes sense for trademark law.
First, according to Bobbitt, in justifying a particular legal
outcome, only those moral arguments that explicitly rely on a
collective sense of right and wrong should survive scrutiny.371 He
explains that moral arguments derive their legitimacy from
consistency with the moral understandings of the larger American
society.372 As a result, moral appeals out of step with the larger
society should be rejected by courts in review.373 Only those moral
arguments that attempt to articulate the collective moral sense of
the polity, not the individualized morality of the judge, should be
369. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 417-18; Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1102-03 (2002).
370. See William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias, 29 CONTEMP.
SOC. 120, 124-25 (2000); see also Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 1124, 1169-79 (2012) (listing strategies for decreasing implicit judicial bias). 
371. See BOBBITT, supra note 59, at 94.
372. See id. at 211.
373. See id.; see also Richard S. Markovitz, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-
Right Answers to Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 427 (1999) (“To be
legitimate, the use of a particular type of legal argument must be consistent with the moral
commitments of the culture in which it is made.”).
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legally credible.374 For particular issues on which no national moral
consensus has been reached, the moral argument will not be
available and judges will have to rely on the other techniques of
legal decision making in their arsenal. 
For example, one potential reason for rejecting a moral argument
in favor of the presumption of tarnishment from sexually related
mark uses is that it is out of step with the sexual mores of large
swaths of the population.375 The judge in the Pink Panther case
seemed willing to presume harm to the plaintiff’s mark based on an
instinctive reaction to homosexuality.376 Yet a majority of Americans
currently support same sex marriage.377 If a large segment of the
buying population would not view a sexual commercial representa-
tion as taboo, then judges should not be able to make a moral appeal
for the banning of such a representation. Of course, it is difficult to
accurately take the moral temperature of the general population on
all matters. Different media sources might arrive at very different
accounts of American ethics—think MSNBC versus Fox News.
Moreover, not every moral argument is susceptible to polling or
other types of evidence that one could use to document generalized
attitudes. Moral arguments will always be difficult to prove and,
like other techniques of legal argument, susceptible to judicial bias.
But following Bobbitt’s prescription will at least keep legal decision
makers on the alert for the influence of their own individual
prejudices.
Second, moral arguments are meant to complement other modes
of legal argument, not crowd them out. Those opposed to any
judicial use of moral arguments maintain that their gravitational
pull is simply too powerful and will cause judges to ignore the
analytical force of other, more neutral methods of legal reasoning.378
374. Efforts to “press a particular vision of the national ethos” that is out of step with the
larger populace may also lead to political reprisal. Robert Post, Democracy, Popular
Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 429, 441-42 (1998).
375. See M. Christopher Bolen et al., When Scandal Becomes Vogue: The Registrability of
Sexual References in Trademarks and Protection of Trademarks from Tarnishment in Sexual
Contexts, 39 IDEA 435, 471 (1999) (noting that courts had not adjusted their standards for
trademark tarnishment in keeping with more generally sexually liberated mores).
376. See supra notes 275-80 and accompanying text.
377. See CNN Poll: Americans’ Attitudes Toward Gay Community Changing, CNN (June
6, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/06/cnn-poll-americans-
attitudes-toward-gay-community-changing/.
378. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
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But one check on the ability of such arguments to stampede decision
making is that moral appeals must be backed up with appeals to
text, history, and public policy. Moral argument is not meant to
displace other argumentative techniques; it is meant only to
supplement them. According to Bobbitt, “no sane judge or law
professor can be committed solely to one approach.”379 An opinion
nakedly based on moral sentiments and nothing else would be
completely unpersuasive under our common law tradition. Hence,
rather than employing a hidden moral heuristic that is papered over
with other techniques of legal argument, judges committed to a
particular outcome or rule should make their moral arguments
transparently, alongside historical, textual, and doctrinal argu-
ments. This is already done to some extent in constitutional law
when judges combine arguments as to precedent, governmental
structure, and public policy along with their sense of the national
ethos.380
The same should be attempted in trademark law. In addition to
perhaps improving the results of judicial decision making, a more
transparent approach to moral argument could provide citizens with
greater knowledge and understanding of the legal process. As
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith write with regard to property
rights, “[r]ights to exclude others from a thing must be grounded in
robust moral notions that are easy to communicate and shared by
the relevant members of the population.”381 Merrill and Smith give
the example of trespass to land, which eschews discussions of
“efficient breach” or internalizing costs through liability rules in
favor of strict prohibitions that are often phrased in deontological
terms.382 By issuing a sharp condemnation of this type of property
right violation, the law of trespass works as a sort of judicial
megaphone that encourages respect for real property even when
actual legal prosecution may be unlikely or the costs to the land-
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1246-48 (1987).
379. BOBBITT, supra note 59, at 124.
380. See Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815,
824; James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings
of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1185 (2012); Andrew Koppelman, Bad
News for Everybody: Lawson and Kopel on Health Care Reform and Originalism, 121 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 515, 524 (2012).
381. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 1855.
382. Id. at 1873-74.
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owner may be minimal or uncertain. Trademark jurisprudence
appears to make some similar moves by creating distinct biases in
favor of domestic users of a particular contested mark and defen-
dants using their own names in business. As noted earlier, these
doctrines are problematic. But perhaps by subjecting their anteced-
ent moral reasoning to the full scrutiny of other judges as well as
the general public, new, more defensible, and perhaps morally
intuitive, rules for navigating the American marketplace will
emerge.
CONCLUSION
The moral responses to a new consumer society, which were
developed at the turn of the nineteenth century, continue to animate
twenty-first century trademark doctrine. Although mostly obscured
behind the consumer efficiency rationale that dominates current
trademark jurisprudence, moral judgments form another critical,
yet largely overlooked, component of judicial reasoning in this area.
Today’s trademark doctrine privileges personal investment in the
marketplace through the personal names rule and emphasis on
intent in infringement, dilution, and secondary liability analyses.
Tarnishment cases appear inconsistent until one considers the
influence of moral sentiment in determining the reputational effects
of sexual use of a plaintiff’s mark. The territoriality principle as well
as judicial interpretation of the Lanham Act’s statutory bars to
registration reveal a nationalist impulse in trademark law. These
rules and interpretations may make little sense when compared to
the utilitarian rhetoric of modern trademark law, but that is
somewhat beside the point. Instead, these doctrinal moves are
animated by moral judgments that have been shaping trademark
law for over one hundred years.
